TTAB Sustains Opposition to Apple's "LIVE PHOTOS," Finding it Generic or Merely Descriptive

Wednesday

In an 87-page opinion issued nine days after oral argument, the Board sustained an opposition to registration of the proposed mark LIVE PHOTOS for "Computer software for recording and displaying images, video and sound" on the grounds of genericness and, alternatively, mere descriptiveness. As to the latter issue, the Board shot down Apple's claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f). Gang Cao v. Apple Inc., Opposition No. 91239006 (June 26, 2021) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Marc A. Bergsman).

Standing: Apple argued that Opposer Cao lacked "standing" to bring the opposition because Cao does not use the term "Live Photos." The Board pointed out, however, that a party need not use the term at issue to establish its entitlement to a statutory cause of action. "Opposer has a real interest in the proceeding because [he] has a present or prospective right to use 'Live Photos' as a generic or descriptive term to describe [his] software." Cao "has a legitimate interest in preventing Applicant from gaining an alleged unfair competitive advantage by maintaining a registration for a purportedly generic or descriptive term for such software."

Genericness: The Board found the genus of services to be not just the identified computer software, but also the resulting images, video, and sound produced by the software, because "the resulting images, video, and sound produced by the software are the purpose or key aspect of the software."

Opposer Cao relied on dictionary definitions, Apple's own use of the term, use by authors and reviewers, and significant third-party usage of "Live Photos" and "Living Photos." Apple argued that the Internet documents constituted hearsay, but that Board pointed out that it did not rely on the documents for the truth of the matter asserted therein. "The probative value of these documents lay in the fact that we may infer consumer perception through what the author wrote and, presumably, what the readers read."

Apple further argued that these documents were of little probative value without proof of the amount of viewership or circulation. The Board, however, found that even if some of the sources of the documents were small enterprises, "there is still a significant body of evidence of third-party use."

Although there is no dictionary definition for “Live Photo(s)”, that fact was not dispositive. See, for example, In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 1 USPQ2d 1110, 1111 (SCREENWIPE held generic even though there was no dictionary definition of the compound term).

We find that the evidence of record in its entirety proves that consumers perceive the term “Live Photo(s)” as a generic term for “computer software for recording and displaying images, video and sound,” including the resulting images, video and sound produced by the software. As Judge Rich explained in In re Abcor Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 219, 219 (CCPA 1978) (Rich, J., concurring), a term that immediately and unequivocally describes the purpose and function of appellant’s goods is a name for those goods, for “[t]hat is what names do. They tell you what the thing is.” The evidentiary record as a whole proves that consumers perceive the term “Live Photo(s)” as a thing, not a source.

Mere Descriptiveness: The Board then considered the alternative ground of refusal, assuming arguendo that LIVE PHOTOS is not generic. Implicit in the Board's genericness holding is a finding that the term is not only merely descriptive, but highly descriptive. Apple claimed that term has acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) and therefore is not merely descriptive under Section 2(e)(1).

Applying the CAFC's Converse factors, the Board noted that there was no survey evidence nor any direct testimony from actual purchasers. Apple's use of the term has not been substantially exclusive. Because the software is pre-installed, it was not clear "whether and the extent to which [consumers] are aware of the “Live Photos” software and whether it plays a role in their decision to purchase an iPhone." There was no evidence that Apple displays the term as a trademark or promotes “Live Photos” as a brand of software exclusively associated with Applicant.

Although Apple's iPhones have been incredibly popular, that fact does little to demonstrate how consumers perceive the term LIVE PHOTOS. Apple claimed extensive copying of the mark, but there was no evidence of any policing efforts on its part. Although media coverage referred to LIVE PHOTOS, it was in the context of a feature of the iPhone camera. "The media attention does not separate 'Live Photo' from Applicant or its iPhone trademark. 'Live Photos' does not stand apart from Applicant or the iPhone mark."

The Board therefore concluded that Apple had failed to prove acquired distinctiveness.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Hat tip to FOB Marc Levy.

BTW: The Board stated that, in addition to genericness and mere descriptiveness, it sustained the opposition "on the ground that [LIVE PHOTOS] has not acquired distinctiveness." (p. 87). My understanding, however, is that Section 2(f) is not a ground for refusal, but merely an escape hatch to avoid a mere descriptiveness refusal (or various other refusals, such as a surname refusal). In other words, there were two grounds for sustaining the opposition, not three

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2021.

TTABlog Test: Is QUARRY VINEYARD Confusable with PEDRERA for Wine?

Tuesday

The USPTO refused to register the proposed mark QUARRY VINEYARD for "wine" [VINEYARD disclaimed], finding confusion likely with the registered mark PEDRERA, also for wine. The cited registration states that the English translation of the Spanish word "pedrera" is "quarry." Applicant FN Cellars argued that the wine industry often uses foreign words as marks for wine, and so an ordinary American consumers would not "stop and translate" the Spanish word. How do you think this came out? In re FN Cellars, LLC, Serial No. 88902267 (June 25, 2021) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge David K. Heasley).

The Board observed that, because the involved goods are identical, it must presume that the goods travel in the same trade channels to the same classes of consumers. These factors weighed heavily in favor of affirmance of the refusal. Moreover, because the goods are identical, a lesser degree of similarity between the marks is necessary to support a finding of likely confusion. [Does that make sense? - ed.].

Examining Attorney Cierra McGill applied the doctrine of foreign equivalents in support of the refusal. That doctrine is applied when "it is likely that the ordinary American purchaser would "stop and translate" the word into its English equivalent. The "ordinary American purchaser" includes "those proficient in a non-English language who would ordinarily be expected to translate the words into English." The purpose of the doctrine is to "protect the perceptions of ordinary American consumers who are multilingual."

The Board has repeatedly and unsurprisingly found that Spanish is a common, modern language in this country, and the Board has "routinely" applied the doctrine of foreign equivalents to Spanish words. The examining attorney submitted dictionary evidence establishing that the Spanish "pedrera" and the English "quarry" are literal and direct equivalents.

FN Cellars maintained that, because American purchasers are accustomed to purchasing wine under foreign brand names, it is improbable that they would stop and translate a rare foreign word like "pedrera" into "quarry."

The Board disagreed. It recognized that in some cases relevant consumers would not stop and translate words from common, modern languages (e.g., TIA MARIA for canned fruits and vegetables; the well-established French term CORDON BLEU).

There is no evidence that PEDRERA is so commonly used among English speakers, like CORDON BLEU, that translation becomes unnecessary. *** There are no personal names, like TIA MARIA and AUNT MARY, to differentiate the marks. *** And there is no exception for alcoholic beverages.

The translation is literal and direct, and there was no evidence that "pedrera" is rare or uncommon.

FN Cellars pointed to the differences in appearance and sound, but the Board ruled that "the equivalency in meaning outweighs the differences in how the marks look and sound." Both marks suggest wines from grapes grown in a rocky terroir.

The Board therefore found confusion likely and it affirmed the refusal to register.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: How did you do? Looking at the bottles of wine, do you think there would be confusion in the real world?

BTW: If the purchaser is proficient in Spanish, why would that purchaser have to stop and translate the word into English in order to understand its meaning?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2021.

Loud music and horn-honking

Monday

A man's home is his castle. The Constitution does not explicitly say that, but cases have said that. It means the police cannot enter your home without a warrant, or unless there is an emergency that requires immediate entry. We call them "exigent" circumstances." This case explores the exigent circumstances principle.

The case is Lange v. California, a Supreme Court case issued on June 23. While driving his car, Lange was playing the music at concert hall volume and honking his horn. This attracted the attention of a police officer, who activated his overhead lights and followed Lange all the way to his house. This was not really a high-speed chase, as Lange lived nearby. The officer followed Lange into his house and tested him for alcohol, finding that Lange's blood alcohol level was three times the legal limit, which explains the loud music and horn-honking. Question: was this search legal? That depends on whether the officer had the right to enter Lange's home.

The Supreme Court many years ago devised the "exigent circumstances" to warrant rule in recognition that sometimes the police need to act quickly to deal with an imminent emergency, such as the destruction of evidence, or a health risk. But what distinguishes this case from the others is that Lange was involved in a misdemeanor "chase" and not a felony. While some misdemeanor cases are actually more serious than felonies, such as domestic violence cases, most misdemeanors are minor offenses that do not involve violence or serious emergencies. Justice Kagan writes:

Our Fourth Amendment precedents thus point toward assessing case by case the exigencies arising from misdemeanants’ flight. That approach will in many, if not most, cases allow a warrantless home entry. When the totality of circumstances shows an emergency—such as imminent harm to others, a threat to the officer himself, destruction of evidence, or escape from the home—the police may act without waiting. And those circumstances, as described just above, include the flight itself^.But the need to pursue a misdemeanant does not trigger a categorical rule allowing home entry, even absent a law enforcement emergency. When the nature of the crime, the nature of the flight, and surrounding facts present no such exigency, officers must respect the sanctity of the home—which means that they must get a warrant.

So there is no hard-and-fast rule in cases like this. But the Court is saying that misdemeanor cases may not always justify a warrantless entry into someone's home. The case now returns to a California court to apply the principles set forth in this case.

TTAB Affirms Failure-to-Function Refusal of NIGGA for Clothing

In a sixty-page opinion, the Board upheld a refusal to register the proposed mark NIGGA (in standard character form) for various clothing items, finding that the term fails to function as a trademark in view of its widespread use on clothing offered by multiple third parties. The Board rejected Applicant Snowflake's argument that the Supreme Court decision in Tam requires registration of racial epithets because of their expressive nature. "Applicant has no constitutional right to register NIGGA if it is otherwise ineligible for registration under the Trademark Act." In re Snowflake Enterprises, LLC, Serial No. 87496454 (June 24, 2021) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher Larkin).

The Board unsurprisingly agreed with Examining Attorney Kevin G. Crennan that Tam "does not dictate the result here."

To be very clear on this issue, the Supreme Court has ruled that the USPTO may not refuse registration of a proposed mark under the invalidated viewpoint-discriminatory provisions of Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act, which were held to violate the First Amendment, but neither Tam nor Brunetti requires the USPTO to register a term simply because it is a racial epithet if it is otherwise unregistrable under any other provisions of the statute.

The fact that a racial epithet has an expressive component does not make it automatically registrable. Expressive messages may still be refused registration "as a commonplace term, message, or expression pursuant to Sections 1, 2, and 45 of the Trademark Act. In short, Snowflake does not have a constitutional right to register the term NIGGA if it is otherwise ineligible for registration."

The Board then reviewed its precedents on failure-to-function refusals, observing once again that "[t]he critical inquiry in determining whether a proposed mark functions as a trademark is how the relevant public perceives it." "Matter that is widely used to convey ordinary or familiar concepts or sentiments, or social, political, religious, or similar informational messages that are in common use, would not be perceived as indicating source and is not registrable as a mark.”

The Examining Attorney submitted webpages depicting clothing and other items displaying the word "nigga" or "niggas," as well as social media pages displaying "#nigga."

Snowflake argued that the USPTO provided no "actual evidence" that NIGGA does not function as a trademark, but only speculation and conjecture. It further maintained that the evidence was not authenticated as bearing a date prior to the application filing date. And it asserted that the USPTO had failed to show that the term lacks expressive content. The Board was not impressed.

The record shows that NIGGA is a “commonplace term” with widely understood meanings, “both in general parlance and on the goods at issue,” 40-0, 2021 USPQ2d 253, at *25, “that merely conveys . . . familiar, well-recognized concept[s] or sentiment[s].” “As a result, consumers will not perceive [NIGGA] appearing on [clothing] as pointing uniquely to Applicant as a single source,” Peace Love World Live, 127 USPQ2d at 1403-04, and it thus fails to function as a mark for those goods for this reason alone.

The USPTO is not required to prove "to a moral certainty that consumers will not perceive NIGGA to function as Applicant's mark" It is sufficient that the evidence "is competent to suggest that upon encountering Applicant’s ‘mark’, prospective purchasers familiar with such widespread non-trademark use are unlikely to consider it to indicate the source of Applicant’s goods.’” Team Jesus, 2020 USPQ2d 11489, at *6 (emphasis added) (quoting DePorter, 129 USPQ2d at 1302).

As to authentication of the third-party evidence, Snowflake did not cite any authority for the proposition that the USPTO's evidence must be ignored because it was not authenticated as being dated prior to the filing date.

The Board’s failure-to-function cases do not impose such a requirement, and they have invariably considered evidence of third-party use that post-dated the filing dates of the subject applications. As discussed above, the “critical inquiry in determining whether a proposed mark functions as a trademark is how the relevant public perceives it,” 40-0, 2021 USPQ2d 253, at *24, and the public’s perception is not “frozen” as of the arbitrary filing date of an application.

Snowflake's third argument was likewise unavailing in light of the evidence of third-party use.

Finally, Snowflake threw in a few more constitutional claims: that the USPTO violated the First Amendment by refusing registration "based on the alleged viewpoint of the speech," and that "[s]imilar marks must be treated similarly under Matal v. Tam." The Board pointed out that Snowflake misunderstands the nature of a failure-to-function refusal; the proposed mark was not refused registration because it is a racial epithet or because of any viewpoint it expresses. Registration was refused because NIGGA is a commonplace and commonly understood term that will not be perceived as a source indicator.

The Board similarly rejected Snowflake's disparate treatment argument. As previously observed, Tam does not require that the USPTO register every racial slur. It must assess each application to register on its own record. While consistency in examination is "highly desirable," that desire must yield to the proper determination of registrability under the Trademark Act and Rules.

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal to register.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: This opinion should be precedential. I hope this case is appealed so that we will have the definitive word from the CAFC and the Supreme Court.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2021.

Wolf Greenfield Seeks Trademark Associate for Boston or New York Office

Friday

Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks, P.C., is accepting applications for the position of trademark and copyright associate, New York or Boston-based. To apply, go here.

"We are seeking an associate to join our Trademark and Copyright group. Qualified applicants will have 3-5 years of experience in trademark matters, including domestic and international clearance, prosecution, and enforcement, as well as experience in managing a global trademark portfolio. The position will also involve drafting motions and other pleadings for the TTAB and Federal Court. Previous experience preparing and responding to cease and desist letters and handling other enforcement matters is preferred. Excellent writing skills, strong academic credentials, business acumen, and strong interpersonal and communication skills are required. An interest in public presentation, writing articles, and active marketing and business development are also required."

Supreme Court upholds vulgar, off-campus speech

The Supreme Court first recognized the constitutional rights of grade-school students to speak out without punishment in 1969, when it ruled in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School District that the speech may only be restricted if it would materially disrupt the educational process. Tinker was also the last time the Supreme Court ruled in favor of students in a free speech case. Until now.

The case is Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L, issued on June 23. In Tinker, the Court said the school could not discipline students who wore anti-Vietnam War armbands in school. But subsequent cases always found in favor of the schools. In 1986, the Court said education authorities could regulate vulgar student speech in school. In 1988, the Court ruled that school principals had broad authority to censor student newspapers. Then, in 2007, the Court said the school could regulate off-campus speech if the student said it the course of a school-sponsored event. The 2007 case was known as the "Bong Hits for Jesus Case."

In Mahanoy, the plaintiff posted on her personal Snapchat account, "Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything." She did this out of frustration over not making the cheerleading squad. The school disciplined her for this. Over the years, federal courts have not been able to agree on how, if at all, schools can regulate off-campus speech. The Supreme Court resolves that dilemma, at least somewhat.

In an 8-1 ruling (Justice Thomas dissenting), the Court notes that the in loco parentis principle (in which the school stands in place for the parents) is diminished when the speech happens off-campus. Also, "courts must be more skeptical of a school’s efforts to regulate off-campus speech, for doing so may mean the student cannot engage in that kind of speech at all. When it comes to political or religious speech that occurs outside school or a school program or activity, the school will have a heavy burden to justify intervention." And the school has an interest in protecting unpopular expression because American schools are "the nurseries of democracy" and our representative democracy will not work unless we protect "the marketplace of ideas." In sum, Justice Breyer writes:

Given the many different kinds of off-campus speech, the different potential school-related and circumstance-specific justifications, and the differing extent to which those justifications may call for First Amendment leeway, we can, as a general matter, say little more than this: Taken together, these three features of much off-campus speech mean that the leeway the First Amendment grants to schools in light of their special characteristics is diminished.

Under this new principle, the student wins the case. Her speech was neither "fighting words" nor obscene as defined under Supreme Court precedent. This was "pure speech" that B.L. uttered off-campus, on her own time, without even mentioning the name of her school, and she did so on her cellphone to her private circle of Snapchat friends. The school's interest in regulating this speech is low, not enough to stifle her free speech interests. And the speech did not substantially disrupt the academic process.

Iowa's Law Targeting "Critical Race Theory"

Thursday

A few weeks ago, Iowa's governor signed a law that she claimed would address the teaching of "critical race theory." Shortly after she signed the bill into law, the Des Moines Register reported:

Iowa Gov. Kim Reynolds signed a new law that she said will target the teaching of critical race theory and other concepts in government diversity trainings and classroom curriculum.

“Critical Race Theory is about labels and stereotypes, not education. It teaches kids that we should judge others based on race, gender or sexual identity, rather than the content of someone’s character,” Reynolds said in a statement. “I am proud to have worked with the legislature to promote learning, not discriminatory indoctrination.”

Critical race theory, a decades-old legal theory that examines how slavery's legacy continues to influence American society, is not specifically named in the new legislation. But the law would ban teaching certain concepts, such as that the U.S. or Iowa is systemically racist.

The new law, House File 802, goes into effect July 1.

Reynolds' signing comes as other Republicans across the country have said they want to eliminate teaching critical race theory and associated concepts from classrooms. Iowa is among more than a dozen states that have considered legislation this year aimed at eliminating similar concepts from classroom curriculum.

That same Register article notes that Iowa's law is based "nearly word for word" on an executive order issued by the Trump Administration (that is now repealed) that banned certain forms of diversity training for federal contractors. The Register's prior reporting on that order is here, the order itself is here.

There are a number of glaring practical problems with the law, which appear to be based, in part, on the bill's origin in a ban on training for contractors. For one, the law contains no penalty or disciplinary provisions, so it is unclear what would result from a violation of the law. The bill also includes prohibitions on certain types of training, but also includes restrictions for school curricula. While the restrictions on training are somewhat explicit, the restrictions on school districts and their curricula are woefully vague.

These defects, and others, are addressed in the remainder of this post, which walks through the law and tries to make sense of what is being restricted.

The Law's Definition of "Scapegoating," "Stereotyping," and Specific Defined Concepts

To start, the law defines a few key phrases:

Section 261H.7(1)(a) defines "Race or sex scapegoating" as "assigning fault, blame, or bias to a race or sex, or to members of a race or sex because of their race or sex, or claiming that, consciously or unconsciously, and by virtue of persons' race or sex, members of any race are inherently racist or are inherently inclined to oppress others, or that members of a sex are inherently sexist or inclined to oppress others.

261H.7(1)(b) defines "Race or sex stereotyping" as "ascribing character traits, values, moral and ethical codes, privileges, status, or beliefs to a race or sex, or to an individual because of the individual's race or sex."

Before moving on to other defined terms, a few thoughts on these definitions.

The "scapegoating" notion is more limited than it may first appear, because it only addresses instances where fault, blame, or bias is attributed to a particular race or sex, or members of a race or sex, because of that person's race or sex. This includes the portion of the definition that addresses conscious and unconscious bias--the definition only applies if that bias is because of the biased person's race or sex. While I am not an expert on the subject, it is my understanding that most discussions of bias often focus on biases being prompted by those being targeted or evaluated, rather than by the holder of the bias. This means that people of all races may have a particular, stereotyped view of a particular race--for example, both White and African-American police officers may hold an unconscious bias against African-American suspects and think that they are more likely to be dangerous. Because such a bias is not dependent on the race of the bias-holder, it would not be encompassed by the definition in the law.

The section on Race or sex stereotyping includes the notion that "privileges" cannot be ascribed to an individual because of their race or sex. This appears to apply to any notion of white privilege, male privilege, or similar concepts. If "Race or sex stereotyping" is prohibited, such a prohibition would prevent teaching or training that teaches people to recognize these types of privilege.

The law then addresses, "Specific defined concepts," which includes:

(1) That one race or sex is inherently superior to another race or sex.

(2) That the United States of America and the state of Iowa are fundamentally or systemically racist or sexist.

(3) That an individual, solely because of the individual's race or sex, is inherently racist, sexist, or oppressive, whether consciously or unconsciously.

(4) That an individual should be discriminated against or receive adverse treatment solely or partly because of the individual's race or sex.

(5) That members of one race or sex cannot and should not attempt to treat others without respect to race or sex.

(6) That an individual's moral character is necessarily determined by the individual's race or sex.

(7) That an individual, by virtue of the individual's race or sex, bears responsibility for actions committed in the past by other members of the same race or sex.

(8) That any individual should feel discomfort, guilt, anguish, or any other form of psychological distress on account of that individual's race or sex.

(9) That meritocracy or traits such as a hard work ethic are racist or sexist, or were created by a particular race to oppress another race.

(10) Any other form of race or sex scapegoating or any other form of race or sex stereotyping.

I haven't dug into the history of this bill or of the Trump Order on which it was based, so I am not sure where this list of defined concepts comes from. There is a bit of overlap with tenets of critical race theory (again, based on my limited knowledge and exposure of it), but this list is largely imprecise, all over the map, and prone to abuse.

To start, the terms "racist" and "sexist" aren't defined. It's therefore unclear whether those notions refer to conscious, intentional racism and sexism, unconscious bias, or disparate impacts of policies and practices that result from historic racism that is no longer as overt (or legally sanctioned) as it once was. For example, concept number 9--the notion that "meritocracy" is racist or sexist--could be implicated by training or teaching that points out that standardized tests tend to favor more privileged white people. While those who write these tests and use these tests in admissions practices likely aren't sitting down and saying "I can't wait to write/evaluate this test in a manner that disadvantages racial minorities!" the imprecise and undefined wording of the statute seems to go beyond this, and prohibit discussion of disparate impacts based on race or sex.

This causes problems for other concepts on the list, including number 2, which addresses fundamental and systemic racism of the United States and the state of Iowa. Perhaps those who hear charges of systemic racism think that critics are accusing most or all people in government of being intentionally biased against particular groups. But such explicit, biased actions are often hidden behind racially-coded proxies (e.g., heightening police presence in "high crime" areas; discussions of "inner cities," and many more examples). Systemic racism may also manifest through facially neutral laws or policies that end up having a disparate impact as a result of historic power structures and discrimination. All of this may be characterized as systemic racism, and all of this may be encompassed by this concept--which is a shame, because there is a great deal of truth behind these concerns.

Affirmative action may also be covered by this list to the extent that its opponents describe it as "reverse racism." If affirmative action is framed as taking away opportunities for, say, white people in favor of racial minorities, it can easily fall under concept number 4, which prohibits adverse treatment because of race or sex.

Number 8 is also particularly concerning: while it is limited to the concept that people "should" feel discomfort of guilt because of their race or sex, it will likely be implemented to prohibit the teaching of any concept that happens to cause such discomfort in members of the audience. The teaching itself may not demand that those in the audience feel discomfort or shame--it may instead call on them to view the world from a different perspective, recognize their privilege, and consider how their seemingly benign conduct may cause greater harm than they realize. Many people confronted with these notions will likely feel uncomfortable, though, which will likely lead them to accuse the teacher of asserting that they should feel uncomfortable. This concept may therefore be used to ban the teaching or training of any concept that happens to cause discomfort in certain audience members and creates a significant potential for abuse.

What Practices Does the Law Affect?

While the law devotes a lot of space to defining stereotyping, scapegoating, and specific concepts, the scope of the law appears, at first, to be limited. Section 25A.1 applies to training by and for members of governmental entities or agencies. It requires that the heads of those agencies:

ensure that any mandatory staff training provided by an employee of an agency, governmental entity, or governmental subdivision, or by a contractor hired by the agency, governmental entity, or governmental subdivision does not teach, advocate, encourage, promote, or act upon stereotyping, scapegoating, or prejudice toward others on the basis of demographic group membership or identity.

I have no idea what this means, primarily because it uses only portions of terms defined at length elsewhere in the law. This provision prohibits the teaching, advocating, encouraging, or promoting of "stereotyping" and "scapegoating." First, this does not explicitly prohibit the teaching of the "Specific defined concepts," nor does it even explicitly prohibit "Race or sex stereotyping" or "Race or sex scapegoating"--as it only uses the (undefined) terms, "stereotyping" and "scapegoating." Are those terms broader than the defined terms? Do they encompass the same behaviors, but with applicability to demographics beyond race and sex? It's unclear. Second, the broad "encouraging" and "promoting" terms may encompass a far broader set of behaviors than actually teaching the specific defined concepts or notions that fall under those defined Race or sex stereotyping/scapegoating. This blog post, for instance, by criticizing the definitions and breadth of the specific defined concepts, may be viewed as "encouraging" or "promoting" those concepts. These imprecise terms will likely result in overcautious behavior by those arranging for training, resulting in the unnecessary chilling of speech (for more background on the problem of vagueness in the First Amendment context, see here).

This section tries to save itself with a list of items it purports not to do, including preventing agencies and entities from promoting diversity and prohibiting a curriculum that teaches sexism, slavery, racial oppression and segregation, and related topics. But the failure to define the scope of what is prohibited and what is not prohibited leaves everything vague--are the restrictions supposed to be read broadly? Are the exceptions supposed to be read broadly? If there is an apparent conflict, which provision wins out?

These problems, which apply to training by and for members of governmental entities or agencies, apply to the law's restrictions on school districts as well. Section 279.74 includes the same vague language--prohibiting any curriculum or student training that "advocate[s], encourage[s], promote[s], or act[s] upon specific stereotyping and scapegoating toward others on the basis of demographic group membership or identity." Again, none of these terms are defined, and the broad "encourage" and "promote" language urges a broad reading that will result in restricted curricula. While the law does not explicitly say that teachers are prohibited from teaching the specific defined concepts, I'd be willing to bet that those who drafted the law would think that doing so would "encourage" or "promote" stereotyping or scapegoating.

The only restriction in the law that mentions the defined terms is the restriction on "each public institution of higher education," from allowing training that happens to "teach, advocate, act upon, or promote specific defined concepts." Why the section about higher educational institutions is the only one that explicitly mentions the "specific defined concepts" is unclear.

This law purports to take on "Critical Race Theory," a notion that the bill's proponents almost certainly do not understand. It takes an imprecise, scattershot approach at banning the teaching and training of various concepts. Through its use of broad notions of "encouraging" or "promoting" undefined notions of "stereotyping" and "scapegoating," the law will almost certainly chill a great deal of speech--including the teaching of facts and well-accepted concepts that happen to make certain audience members uncomfortable. I won't get into the law's constitutional implications and whether it would survive a challenge, as this post is long enough as it is, but it's a shame to see the passage of such a shortsighted and poorly written law.

TTAB Affirms Refusal to Register Canned Fish Packaging on the Supplemental Register: Functional and Generic

Applicant Interpage's quixotic attempt to register, on the Supplemental Register, the packaging design shown below for canned fish, ran into a TTABrick wall. The Board agreed with Examining Attorney Christopher M. Nunley that the design is de jure functional and generic. "Granting Applicant exclusive rights to the proposed packaging configuration design would prevent its competitors from continuing to offer their canned or tinned fish with the see-through top feature." In re Interpage International, Inc., Serial No. 88586036 (June 21, 2021) [not precedential] (Opinion by Thomas W. Wellington).

Preclusion against the USPTO?: Interpage had previously applied to register, on the Principal Register, nearly the identical design for some of the same goods, but was refused registration on the ground of functionality and, alternatively lack of distinctiveness. The Board then reversed the functionality refusal but upheld the non-distinctiveness refusal, finding Interpage's Section 2(f) evidence inadequate. [TTABlogged here]. Interpage now argued that, in light of the Board's prior decision on functionality, the USPTO should be precluded from raising that issue again. Nothing doing, said the TTAB. The Board pointed out that the USPTO is not a party in an ex parte appeal, but rather is merely fulfilling its role regarding the examination of applications. Moreover, there is a strong public interest in preventing registration of functional "marks." In short, "the Office should not be precluded from raising a functionality ground for refusal, even if the Office failed to meet its burden in proving the ground in a prior appeal proceeding involving the same applicant, same mark, and same goods or services."

Furthermore, although the Board should strive for consistency in our holdings, we are not compelled to reach the same determination as to functionality of Applicant’s package configuration mark, particularly given a different record has been adduced by the Examining Attorney and Applicant in this appeal.

Functionality: The Examining Attorney contended that the easy-opening, transparent lid and the common round shape have "multiple utilitarian advantages" that make the configuration "one of the superior designs available." The design "offers transparency to inspect the goods and is easier to open than a metal lid." The Board, without much discussion, agreed.

Genericness: The Board observed that "[T]rade dress that cannot serve as an indicator of source is generic and unprotectable." Product packaging that is common in an industry will not be perceived as indicating source and is not registrable on either Register. The evidence showed that the subject cylindrical can design with a transparent top has been adopted by numerous competitors.

In sum, the evidence establishes that consumers of canned or tinned fish will primarily regard the applied-for product package design as a common type of container for tinned or canned fish, rather than as a source indicator for Applicant’s goods in particular. In view of the above, we find Applicant’s product packaging design to be generic and thus unable to function as a trademark.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: WYHA?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2021.

Family association claim fails under Rule 12

Wednesday

There are certain rights and entitlements that do not expressly appear in the U.S. Constitution. The right to intimate family association is one of them. The courts have implied that such right exists and can predicate a damages claim -- if that right is actually violated. It was not violated in this case.

The case is Keller v. Schoharie County Dept. of Social Services, a summary order issued on May 20. Keller claims that defendants violated her constitutional right to intimate association with family and her right to privacy by interfering with her relationship with her then-minor daughter, C.K, and revealing her mental health issues to C.K. Keller. A body of case law governs cases like this:

To state a claim for infringement of the right to familial association, a plaintiff must allege conduct “so shocking, arbitrary, and egregious that the Due Process Clause would not countenance it even were it accompanied by full procedural protection.” State action that is “incorrect or ill-advised” is insufficient to give rise to a substantive due process violation; rather, the action must be “conscience-shocking.” A plaintiff must also allege “that state action was specifically intended to interfere with the family relationship.” While “parents enjoy a constitutionally protected interest in their family integrity, this interest is counterbalanced by the compelling governmental interest in the protection of minor children, particularly in circumstances where the protection is considered necessary as against the parents themselves.”

So we have a strict burden of proof in this area. Plaintiff cannot survive this legal standard, and her case is dismissed under Rule 12 for failure to state a plausible claim. While she claims the defendants "destroyed her relationship with her daughter by telling her that Keller has serious mental health issues and should be on medication but is not," this "unwise and inappropriate" statement "does not rise to the level of ignoring overwhelming exculpatory information or manufacturing false evidence." What is more, "the estrangement between mother and daughter came after a years-long abusive relationship that resulted in multiple orders of protection against Keller. It is implausible to credit the breakdown in relationship to the comments of Woods and Baldwin where multiple instances of domestic violence by Keller against C.K. resulted in multiple lawful restraining orders and a no-contact order."

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Section 2(d) Appeals Turn Out?

The TTAB recently decided the appeals from the three Section 2(d) likelihood of confusion refusals summarized below. Keeping in mind that, by my estimate, 90 % of Section 2(d) appeals result in affirmance of the refusal, how do you think these came out? [Answer will be found in the first comment.]

In re Mad Brewing Company, Application Serial No. 88757335 (June 16, 2021) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cynthia C. Lynch). [Section 2(d) refusal of QUIRK for "beer, ale and lagers" in view of the identical mark for "hotel, restaurant and bar services." Applicant argued that the USPTO failed to prove the "something more" required to establish relatedness than the mere fact that bars and restaurants serve beer.

Quirk Hotel, Richmond, VA.

In re Emma Sievers, Serial No. 88559109 (June 16, 2021) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cheryl S. Goodman). [Section 2(d) Refusal of B.A. WOMEN for "Clothing, namely, t-shirts, long sleeved shirts, hoodies, short sets, sport tops, leggings, tank tops, athletic tops and bottoms for women" [WOMEN disclaimed] in view of the registered mark B.A. MAN for "Hats; Jogging suits; Pants; Shorts; Yoga pants" [MAN disclaimed]. Applicant contended that, based on the suspension of the limited liability company that owns the cited mark and her online search of Registrant’s use, the cited mark appeared to be abandoned.]

In re Salt Works Brewing Company, LLC, Serial No. 86970058 (June 11, 2021) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge George C. Pologeorgis). [Section 2(d) refusal of SALT WORKS BREWING COMPANY for beer, ale, porter, and the like [BREWING COMPANY disclaimed], in view of the registered mark SALTWORKS PROPERTY for "distilled spirits." Applicant maintained that because the USPTO has permitted numerous pairs of similar marks to register for different alcoholic beverages, there can be no likelihood of confusion between its mark and the cited mark. In support, it relied on copies of nineteen pairs of registered marks obtained from the USPTO database.]

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: How did you do? See any WYHAs here?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2021.

TTABlog Test: Is BREAUXS for Barbecue Grills Primarily Merely a Surname?

Tuesday

The USPTO refused to register the proposed mark BREAUXS for barbecue grills, electric fryers, and the like, finding it to be primarily merely a surname under Section 2(e)(4). Applicant Plummer appealed, arguing that "breaux" is commonly understood as a slang term for "bro," particularly in connection with the "quintessentially masculine American pastime" of barbecue grilling. How do you think this came out? In re MacDonald Plummer, Serial No. 88155158 (June 18, 2021) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Peter W. Cataldo).

The evidence showed that "Breaux" is "an actual surname, and is not rare." The term "Breauxs" is likewise to be considered a surname, since "the surname significance of a term is not diminished by the fact that the term is presented in its plural or possessive form."

Applicant Plummer contended that "Breaux" has a non-surname meaning: it would be understood "as a Cajun slang equivalent or play on the word BROS," and thus will be seen as a reference to the "bro" subculture. Plummer submitted evidence regarding the meaning of the term "bro," and an article discussing the grilling and the masculine culture traditionally surrounding grilling. An Urban Dictionary entry defined "breaux" as a synonym for “bro or brajh, but in this case it’s that guy in the bro crew that is fully cajun and all of this family members [sic] live in new orleans or anywhere in Louisiana for that matter.” Plummer raised this question: "how else does one imagine a Cajun 'breaux' other than standing at a grill with other guys and beers in hand?"

Examining Attorney Jacob W. Neu argued that the surname meaning of "breaux" is "far more familiar to consumers than the meaning of 'breaux' as a novel spelling of 'bro.'" He pointed out that the Urban Dictionary entries were dated 2007 and 2009, whereas the current entry for "breaux" refers to the designer Matteo Breaux.

The Board agreed with the Examining Attorney. The evidence showed that there is a non-surname meaning for "breaux," but "the mere existence of other non-surname meanings of a mark does not preclude a finding that it is primarily merely a surname. The question is "to what degree, if any, the public would associate the particular meaning with the goods or services in the application."

[O]n this record it is not clear to what extent, if any, the term “breaux” is understood to be synonymous with “bro” outside of fans of LSU athletics. Particularly given that a large percentage of individuals with the surname “Breaux” appear to live in Louisiana, it is more likely that consumers viewing BREAUXS will perceive the mark as a plural of the surname.

The Board concluded that, in light of the strong evidence of the surname significance of BREAUX(S), consumers would apply the surname meaning to the mark.

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal to register.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Compare this decision with In re Isabella Fiore [TTABlogged here], where the mark FIORE was found not to be primarily merely as surname because Italian speakers would translate the word as "flower."

TTAB Dismisses MANDALAEVERYWEAR Opposition; Opposer Proved Prior Advertisement But Not Prior Rendering of Services

Monday

Opposer James Barnard claimed prior use of the mark MANDALA for business consulting and branding services, and alleged likelihood of confusion with the Applicant's proposed mark MANDALAEVERYWEAR for marketing consulting services. However, Barnard's proofs showed only that he advertised his services but not that he rendered the services. The was fatal to his priority claim and so the Board dismissed the opposition. James Barnard v. Mandala Wear, LLC, Opposition No. 91252489 (June 16, 2021) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Frances S. Wolfson).

In order to establish a claim under Section 2(d), an opposer must prove both priority of use and likelihood of confusion. Here Opposer Barnard relied on his alleged common law service mark rights, claiming that he had used the mark prior to applicant's filing date (its constructive first use date) of March 26, 2019.

Section 45 of the Trademark Act states, in pertinent part, that a service mark is in use in commerce when "it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce ...."

Opposer Barnard claimed that he started using the MANDALA mark in 2019. He submitted webpages that he testified were "displayed in 2018," as well as a "proposal" presented to prospective customers in October 2018. The Board found that, although these documents "support Opposer's advertising his mark" for his services, they "do not prove that Opposer has rendered these services."

To be considered use in commerce, not only must the mark be used or displayed in the sale or advertising of the services, the services must be actually rendered. Opposer never affirmatively asserted that he has rendered brand concept or brand development services to any customer under the MANDALA mark. Thus, Opposer has not submitted either a statement of facts set forth in detail in an affidavit by a knowledgeable affiant (see Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Comput. Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1786 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted)) or any additional evidence to demonstrate that Opposer ever rendered his identified services in commerce.

Due to Opposer's failure to prove priority of use, the Board dismissed the opposition.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Opposer did not argue priority based on use "analogous to trademark use." Would that have worked? Would he need to show significant exposure of the mark in terms of website visits and the like?

Court upholds summary judgment against age discrimination plaintiff

Thursday

In this case, the Court of Appeals affirms the grant of summary judgment to management on the plaintiff's age discrimination claim even though she argued that multiple younger candidates were offered positions for which she was more qualified.

The case is Peddy v. L'Oreal, a summary order issued on May 20. I argued the appeal for Peddy. After her position was eliminated, Peddy reapplied for six or seven other jobs within the company. The positions went to younger candidates, and the evidence showed that many of them did not have the minimal qualifications for the position. The company argued that it used business judgment in making these hiring decisions, and that it had a policy of not rehiring employees into lesser titles that would amount to demotions for the candidate.

The Court of Appeals (Walker, Park and Nardini) held as follows: first, it noted that the Second Circuit stated in Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2001), that in a failure-to-hire case, the plaintiff must show her credentials were “so superior to the credentials of the person selected for the job that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question.” That holding favors the defendant in this case, the Court states, because "For the positions Peddy highlights, the selected candidates each had experience that roughly matched the job postings. Thus, Peddy’s credentials were not 'so superior' that they would support an inference of discrimination." This is interesting reasoning. The Court does not note Peddy's argument that the selectees did not have the minimum qualifications or Peddy's experience in the industry. This holding stretches Byrnie quite a bit.

A few words about the "so superior" standard in Byrnie. Title VII does not include this language, which draws from the general rule that management enjoys some discretion in choosing among qualified candidates. Byrnie, in turn, took the lead from two other appellate rulings, Deines v. Tex. Dept. of Protective & Regulatory Services, 164 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 1999), and Fischbach v. D.C. Dept. of Corrections, 86 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1996). These cases stand for the proposition that the plaintiff cannot win unless “no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question” (Deines) and “Title VII liability cannot rest solely upon a judge's determination that an employer misjudged the relative qualifications of admittedly qualified candidates” (Fischbach). A reading of Dienes shows the Fifth Circuit had been using that language for years. The D.C. Circuit had also previously used this language, and Fischbach cites the general rule that courts cannot serve as super-personnel boards. Should the courts reconsider this judge-made principle that might excuse subconscious or even overt bias when other candidates are also qualified for the position? Surely a jury can find that management discriminated even when choosing among qualified candidates.

Another holding in Peddy is the Court's finding that management had a policy that prohibited re-hiring employees into lesser positions. But the evidence for this "policy" was the deposition testimony of a managerial witness, not a written policy. We argued the jury does not have to credit that policy because it was breached on two occasions with other employees and the jury does not have accept testimony from interested witnesses, as per the Supreme Court's language in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000): "although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that 'evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.'” Plaintiffs' lawyers often cite this language from Reeves, but I have not seen the Court of Appeals invoke it for purposes of rejecting summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.

“no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question.” Deines v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 280–81 (5th Cir.1999); see also Fischbach, 86 F.3d at 1183 (“Title VII liability cannot rest solely upon a judge's determination that an employer misjudged the relative qualifications of admittedly qualified candidates.”).

Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2001)

Precedential No. 17: TTAB Dismisses ADVENTIST Cancellation Petition Due to Failure to Maintain "Standing"

Finding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate its entitlement to maintain its genericness claim (f/k/a standing), the Board tossed out this petition for cancellation of two registrations for the mark ADVENTIST for religious publications, film production and distribution, educational services, and religious and missionary services. The Board concluded that Petitioner did not to satisfy either prong of the Lexmark test at the time of trial: its interests did not fall with the protectable zone of interests of Section 14, and there was no reasonable basis in fact for a belief in damages proximately caused by the continued existence of the challenged registrations. Philanthropist.com, Inc. v. The General Conference Corporation of Seventh-day Adventists, 2012 USPQ2d 643 (TTAB 2021) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jonathan Hudis).

In every inter partes proceeding the plaintiff must establish its entitlement to a statutory cause of action, Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111 USPQ2d 1058, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014), and must maintain that entitlement throughout the proceeding, including at the time or trial. In its case-in-chief, a plaintiff must introduce evidence to support the allegations in its pleading that relate to its entitlement. See Lipton Indus., 213 USPQ at 189; TBMP 309.03(b).

For a cancellation proceeding under Section 14, a plaintiff must demonstrate “an interest falling within the zone of interests protected by the statute and … proximate causation.” Corcamore, LLC v. SFM, LLC, 978 F.3d 1298, 2020 USPQ2d 11277, at *4 (Fed. Cir.) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 109 USPQ2d 2061, 2067-70 (2014)), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___ (2020).

Another way of stating the requirement is that a plaintiff must prove a real interest in the proceeding and a reasonable belief of damage. Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v. Naked TM, LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 2020 USPQ2d 10837, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also Empresa Cubana, 111 USPQ2d at 1062. The CAFC has found “no meaningful, substantive difference between the analytical frameworks expressed in Lexmark and Empresa Cubana.” Corcamore, 2020 USPQ2d 11277 at *4.

Thus, “a party that demonstrates a real interest in cancelling a trademark under [Trademark Act Section 14, 15 U.S.C.] § 1064 has demonstrated an interest falling within the zone of interests protected by [the Trademark Act]. … Similarly, a party that demonstrates a reasonable belief of damage by the registration of a trademark demonstrates proximate causation within the context of § 1064.” Corcamore, 2020 USPQ2d 11277, at *7.

Often a party that challenges a term as generic will base its entitlement on the fact that it is engaged in marketing goods or services that are the same or similar to those of the other party. That was not the case here. Petitioner's business is the acquisition and sale of domain names.

Although Section 14 states that any person "who believes that he is or will be damaged" may petition for cancellation, "there are limits to this statutory right – that is, the cancellation plaintiff must meet the 'zone of interests' and 'proximate causation' tests set out in Lexmark, 109 USPQ2d at 2068-70."

“The purpose of the zone-of-interests test is to ‘foreclose[] suit … when a plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress authorized that plaintiff to sue.’” Corcamore, 2020 USPQ2d 11277, at *7 (quoting Lexmark, 109 USPQ2d at 2068 (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

In November 2016, Respondent sent a cease-and-desist letter to Petitioner, demanding transfer of the domain name <adventist.com> to Respondent. Petitioner refused, but offered to sell the domain name for $1.2 million. When that offer was declined, Petitioner filed the instant petition for cancellation in January 2017, a few days before the National Arbitration Forum ruled against Respondent in a UDRP proceeding seeking transfer of the domain name. Respondent did not appeal the UDRP decision or take any further action with regard to the domain name.

Petitioner has never published any content at any website resolving to the domain name. "All Petitioner has ever done is to hold it for future sale at an inflated price (a practice known as 'warehousing'), or to redirect Internet users to the TTABVUE docket page for these proceedings."

Petitioner claimed that it was under a "legal threat" from the ADVENTIST registration, but the Board noted that the cancellation petition included only three of the four classes of goods and services in the registrations, and so even if Petitioner prevailed in this proceeding, it would ostensibly remain under threat from Respondent's continuing ownership of one of the registrations (covering employee health care programs and insurance). The Board concluded that Petitioner failed to satisfy either prong of the Lexmark test:

We find that Petitioner’s interests, which do not have anything to do with trademark concerns (whether its own trademark concerns or concerns about how others’ trademark rights might endanger its business model), are outside the zone of interests reflected in Trademark Act Section 14. Further, it cannot reasonably be assumed Congress intended to authorize a party in Petitioner’s circumstances to bring and maintain these cancellation proceedings. Corcamore, 2020 USPQ2d 11277, at *7. We further find that Petitioner’s claim of proximate causation (its belief in damage) has no “reasonable basis in fact.” Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1999). To the extent Petitioner’s belief in damage may have existed at the time Petitioner brought these proceedings in January 2017, clearly it has not been maintained. We therefore conclude that Petitioner has not shown its entitlement to the statutory cause of action it asserts here.

And so, the Board denied the petition for cancellation.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Readers, you cannot ignore Lexmark any more. "Standing" is no longer a slam dunk.

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TTAB Sustains Opposition to Apple's "LIVE PHOTOS," Finding it Generic or Merely Descriptive

Wednesday

TTABlog Test: Is QUARRY VINEYARD Confusable with PEDRERA for Wine?

Tuesday

Loud music and horn-honking

Monday

TTAB Affirms Failure-to-Function Refusal of NIGGA for Clothing

Wolf Greenfield Seeks Trademark Associate for Boston or New York Office

Friday

Supreme Court upholds vulgar, off-campus speech

Recommended Reading: Zerounian and Thiele, "An Introduction to the Trademark Moderization Act"

Iowa's Law Targeting "Critical Race Theory"

Thursday

TTAB Affirms Refusal to Register Canned Fish Packaging on the Supplemental Register: Functional and Generic

Family association claim fails under Rule 12

Wednesday

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Section 2(d) Appeals Turn Out?

TTABlog Test: Is BREAUXS for Barbecue Grills Primarily Merely a Surname?

Tuesday

TTAB Dismisses MANDALAEVERYWEAR Opposition; Opposer Proved Prior Advertisement But Not Prior Rendering of Services

Monday

Court upholds summary judgment against age discrimination plaintiff

Thursday

Precedential No. 17: TTAB Dismisses ADVENTIST Cancellation Petition Due to Failure to Maintain "Standing"

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