Lawyers who handle Section 1983 cases know qualified immunity, which eliminates liability against police officers and other public officials if the law at the time of the incident was not clearly established, that is, no Second Circuit case was directly on point. This case highlights a gloss on qualified immunity.
The case is Chase v. Town of Canton, a summary order issued on October 4. The idea behind qualified immunity is that if the law was not clearly-established, then the police or other public official was not on constructive notice that he was violating someone's constitutional rights. So the case is dismissed as early as possible since this immunity was intended to prevent public officials from being sued in the first place. This principle is so strong that if qualified immunity is denied on the summary judgment motion, the defendant seeking immunity can take an interlocutory appeal on that issue rather than wait for a final judgment, which is when most appeals can be taken.
The rule that the defendant may take an immediate appeal does not count, however, when the trial court in denying summary judgment says there are factual disputes that must be resolved before qualified immunity can be determined. That is what happened here.
This case alleges that plaintiff was falsely arrested and denied equal protection arising from her alleged false statement to the police about a sexual assault against her. The trial court denied summary judgment on the qualified immunity issue because a jury must first determine if she intentionally made a false written statement about the incident, among other things. That is enough for the Court of Appeals (Chin, Nardini and Livingston) to find there is no appellate jurisdiction over the appeal. The Court states:
We likewise conclude that factual disputes preclude our consideration of the officers’ assertion of qualified immunity. The parties disagree on several facts material to the existence of probable cause, including whether Chase made her initial written statement under oath; whether Chase omitted the full extent of the sexual contact in her initial statements with the intent to mislead authorities; whether Chase characterized the sexual contact as consensual; the circumstances of her supplemental filing and its potential impact on a magistrate; and the contents and weight accorded to various details in a hypothetical corrected affidavit. Defendants-Appellants have not shown that they would be entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law under Chase’s version of the facts, and thus we cannot consider their claim.
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