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The Second Amendment and Legislative "Protection" of Constitutional Rights

Tuesday

This column in yesterday's Des Moines Register by the Editorial Board caught my eye. It begins:

Is state Rep. Chip Baltimore clairvoyant?
The Boone Republican was arrested last week, charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and possession of a firearm while under the influence of alcohol. Interestingly, less than 10 months ago, he voted to support legislation reducing penalties for toting a gun while drunk. Lucky for him, that bill was signed into law.
According to a police report, Baltimore was stopped by an Ames officer early Friday morning after authorities received reports of a reckless driver traveling northbound on Interstate Highway 35. With his slurred speech and bloodshot eyes, he told the officer he was on his way home after attending meetings in Des Moines, the report said.
. . .  
Last legislative session, Baltimore was among the lawmakers who supported the Iowa Omnibus Gun Law.

Before this law went into effect, carrying a firearm while intoxicated was an aggravated misdemeanor, punishable by up to two years in prison. An OWI conviction provided clear grounds for revocation of a permit to carry a weapon.

The new law, which went into effect July 1, cuts in half potential jail time and allows drunken drivers the ability to keep their permits to carry handguns.

At the time, one Iowa sheriff questioned the change, baffled that state legislators recognized the danger of operating a vehicle while drunk but not carrying a lethal weapon while intoxicated.


“We know alcohol blurs judgment,” said Black Hawk County Sheriff Tony Thompson. “I’m not sure what the driving force was behind watering that down.”

The Register's earlier article reporting Baltimore's arrest is here. Notably, Baltimore was stopped when an officer observed him driving at 55 mph in a 70 mph zone entering a 65 mph zone. For those interested in DUI-related trivia (who isn't?), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration states that driving at 10 miles or more below the speed limit is an indicator of possible impaired driving. The same is not true of speeding.
 
This story is my quirky introduction for a much broader discussion of misleading rhetoric regarding the "protection" of constitutional rights through legislation. For those only interested in the adventures and apparent foresight of Chip Baltimore (and accompanying DUI trivia), stop reading now!

The Omnibus Gun Law referenced in the column was lauded by advocates upon its passage as a victory for Iowans' Second Amendment rights. The Washington Post reported on the passage of the bill back in April 2017:
Branstad, the long-serving Republican governor selected by President Trump to be ambassador to China, signed a bill that many say is the most comprehensive and broadest piece of legislation on gun rights the state has ever seen. House File 517 will, among other things, allow citizens to use deadly force if they believe their lives are threatened; it will also allow them to sue local government officials if they think gun-free zones have violated their Second Amendment rights.

The signing of House File 517 last week marks the end of a decades-long battle for a bill that does more than make incremental changes to the state’s gun laws and will bring Iowa in line with its more gun-friendly neighbors such as Missouri and Wisconsin, said Barry Snell, president of the Iowa Firearms Coalition, an advocacy group affiliated with the National Rifle Association.

“Without exaggeration, House File 517 is the most monumental and sweeping piece of gun legislation in Iowa’s history,” Snell told The Washington Post. “Never before have we passed a bill in which Iowa’s Second Amendment rights are legally recognized, claimed and protected quite so profoundly as this bill does.”
Snell's statement expresses a familiar sentiment, but also reveals a common misconception about how constitutional rights function in relation to laws passed by legislatures. State laws are not needed to recognize or protect constitutional rights. If a law restricts the right to bear arms so much that it violates the Second Amendment, those who are burdened or injured by the law may challenge it and the courts will strike down the law if it is unconstitutional. The scope of the Amendment is a matter of constitutional law that is ultimately determined by the United States Supreme Court -- not by legislatures.
 
While I'm not surprised to see this sort of misleading rhetoric used by the head of an advocacy group, the article quoted Professor Randy Barnett who blogs at the excellent Volokh Conspiracy, who made an unfortunately similar point:
The legislation might make Iowa “the leading edge of protecting the civil right” to bear arms, said Randy Barnett, a law professor at Georgetown University.
“When you have a constitutional right, it often requires the legislation to protect that right,” Barnett said. “That’s what Iowa is doing.”
Of course, states may use legislation or amend their own constitutions to reduce government's ability to restrict gun possession use. For example, Louisiana amended its state constitution to state that any law restricting the right to bear arms is subject to strict scrutiny review in the courts -- a standard that is likely higher than the (admittedly unclear) approach required by the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. But the action of legislatures is not required to protect constitutional rights -- rather, it is the purpose of judicial review is to place protection of these rights in the hands of the courts.

I've expressed approval for certain state laws or constitutional provisions that effectively expand the scope of federal constitutional rights. Laws that do this in the Fourth Amendment context restricting unreasonable searches and seizures, for example, are a good idea -- particularly when it comes to developing technology like drones. Courts, particularly the United States Supreme Court, may be slow to react to rapid changes and the complexities of new technologies, and the legislature -- if properly informed -- can impose restrictions on law enforcement that fill in holes in the doctrine. Of course, I would not say that these laws are necessary to protect the Fourth Amendment. At most, I'd say that these laws protect people from intrusion by the government in instances where the Fourth Amendment may not apply, or may not clearly apply, and therefore are consistent with the spirit of the Fourth Amendment.

Barnett would likely argue that the courts cannot protect all violations of constitutional rights. People may lack the resources, time, or will to pursue a constitutional challenge, and laws may prevent circumstances from arising that give rise to the violation of rights in the first place. This is evident in the Fourth Amendment context, where unlawful searches and seizures are likely conducted hundreds, or even thousands, of times per day. So on a practical level, legislative restrictions may ultimately result in fewer infringements of people's Fourth Amendment rights.

But this argument does not cleanly translate to the Second Amendment context. The Fourth Amendment has been the subject of numerous Supreme Court opinions that have fleshed out a complex doctrine of protections, exceptions, and consequences of Fourth Amendment violations. But the Supreme Court has refused to return to the Second Amendment after its opinions in Heller and McDonald, opting to deny certiorari in some tantalizing cases and leave the development of Second Amendment doctrine to the lower courts. In the absence of continued Supreme Court attention, the ultimate scope of Second Amendment protection remains unclear and inconsistent across different circuits. To claim that Second Amendment rights are frequently violated and that these violations are not addressed by the courts is therefore a far less certain proposition than a similar claim regarding the violation of Fourth Amendment rights.

When politicians and academics say that laws are necessary to protect and preserve the Second Amendment, they are, at best, speaking imprecisely and, at worst, being misleading. Instead, these advocates are assuming that the unclear Second Amendment right provides certain protections and asserting that these protections be enshrined in the law in order to uphold the right. A lack of clarity and a failure of the Supreme Court to set clear standards or to revisit the Second Amendment are translated into a claimed need for legislative action -- and laws purporting to "protect" the right are born as a result.

The courts will protect rights, striking down overly restrictive laws if need be. Whether the rights are broad or narrow is for the Supreme Court to decide. Legislatures, in turn, may opine as to the spirit of constitutional rights and pass laws that provide additional protections that are consistent with the spirit of the rights. In the case of the Second Amendment, the Iowa legislature apparently believes that the spirit of the Second Amendment protects people from severe criminal penalties should they be carrying a firearm while drunk. And if the rhetoric of Snell and Professor Barnett is to be taken seriously, this is apparently what the United States Constitution envisions as well.

If lawmakers believe that respecting and protecting the Second Amendment requires legislation that decreases the penalties against those who carry firearms while intoxicated, then it's the legislature's prerogative to enact such legislation. All I can say at this point is kudos to Representative Baltimore for his foresight in supporting this legislation, and to implore advocates like Snell and Barnett to think about the legislature's role in relation to the Second Amendment before making overly broad claims.

READ MORE - The Second Amendment and Legislative "Protection" of Constitutional Rights

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Don't Operate Drones While Drunk in New Jersey, and Other Crimes

Wednesday

Through this angrily-titled Reason article, "Good Riddance to Chris Christie," I learned about a recent law in New Jersey that creates several new drone-related crimes. The text of S3370, which Governor Christie signed into law on Monday, is available here.

The bill creates several new drone-related crimes. One of the more widely-reported restrictions is a ban on the operation of drones while under the influence of alcohol, narcotics, hallucinogens, "habit-producing" drugs, or with a blood alcohol level of 0.08% or more. This restriction has led to the publication of several articles that whimsically announce the restriction on "drunk droning" or "drinking and droning." I'm not sure if I'm ready to approve of these publications use of "drone" as a verb, as operating drones does not necessarily involve speaking at length in a boring manner, but the restriction is worth noting.

It's also worth mentioning that federal regulations already place even stricter alcohol-related restrictions on the commercial operation of drones. This concise explainer by Jonathan Rupprecht points out that commercial drone operators can't fly drones within eight hours of consuming alcohol or with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.04% or higher. Rupprecht also notes that hobbyist drone users that operate drones while intoxicated may run afoul of federal regulations if their activity is deemed to "threaten the safety of the national airspace system."

New Jersey bans more than the drunken operation of drones. The law also includes provisions prohibiting people from using drones while hunting, and from using drones to prevent people from hunting. The law also bans the operation of drones in "a manner that endangers the life or property of another," and prohibits people from using drones from conducting surveillance on correctional facilities or "endanger[ing] the safety or security" of these facilities by operating drones on their premises.

But wait, there's more!

The law creates an offense for drone users whose drones interfere with "first responders," (which include law enforcement officers, firefighter, ambulance operators, and others). California has attempted to pass similar legislation that would criminalize operating drones near fires, as this activity has reportedly hindered firefighting efforts. But these crimes have yet to become law in California due to Governor Jerry Brown's reluctance to expand California's bloated Penal Code. Governor Christie, however, appears to have no such qualms.

A final provision of note is a revision to the law governing the penalty of "parole supervision for life" that is imposed on certain sex offenders and those convicted of kidnapping pursuant to N.J.S.A. C.2C:43-6.4. The provision states that the parole supervision for life "may include reasonable conditions prohibiting or restricting the person's operation of an unmanned aircraft system in order to reduce the likelihood of a recurrence of criminal or delinquent behavior." While drones can (and occasionally have) been used to hover creepily outside of people's windows, this is a strangely specific provision to add to the various restrictions that sex offenders face.

I'm generally opposed to imposing restrictions on private drone users, as tortious or invasive behavior with drones could probably be prosecuted or litigated under more general existing laws. I do approve of legislative restrictions on government drone use, but New Jersey appears to have yet to impose such restrictions. The last attempt at doing so failed a year ago when Governor Christie failed to sign off on a bill that would have imposed a warrant restriction (with certain exceptions) on drone use by law enforcement agencies. Perhaps Governor Phil Murphy will act differently should a similar bill make its way through the legislature in the future.

READ MORE - Don't Operate Drones While Drunk in New Jersey, and Other Crimes

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Star Wars: The Last Jedi: The Review of the Shapiro Review

Monday

I watched Star Wars: The Last Jedi when it first opened. While there is a lot to digest, I enjoyed the movie overall. I've been meaning to watch it again, but in the meantime, I have been taking in the odd phenomenon of self-proclaimed Star Wars enthusiasts who often happen to be political conservatives attacking the film. With every negative review I read, the more I like The Last Jedi.

Which is why after all of the presents were unwrapped on Christmas morning, this tweet from Randy Barnett was a nice bonus gift:

I don't pay attention to Ben Shapiro because why should anyone? But Randy Barnett is a law professor and noted conservative voice who blogs at the excellent Volokh Conspiracy -- making me all the more sad to see him promoting what turns out to be repetitive, ill-conceived complaining about The Last Jedi.

For those of you who enjoy reading negative reviews of the movie like I do, I recommend reading Shapiro's review first, which you can find here. And because it is Christmas day, the presents have all been opened, and I still have a lot of leftover rage from some family ping pong games, my response to Shapiro's review is below the break. There are many spoilers, so don't read ahead if you want to avoid those.

It should be noted that Randy Barnett is a law professor and Ben Shapiro apparently went to Harvard Law, so that should be enough of a legal hook to let me post it on this law blog.

Shapiro's criticisms are numbered in an attempt to hoodwink the audience into believing that repetition and verbosity are hallmarks of sophistication. The numbers and taglines of each complaint are listed below, and Shapiro's complaints are summarized when necessary, but for the full version of each, you will need to read his article which I am not going to re-quote in its near-entirety here.

1. The Force Awakens Apparently Never Happened. 

Shapiro is confused why the First Order still has weapons after their base was destroyed. Why this translates into The Force Awakens never happening is unclear, as only the base was destroyed in that film. The same criticism could be made of Empire Strikes Back, where the Empire still has numerous ships, including a Super Star Destroyer, after the Death Star's destruction. But nothing in Star Wars: A New Hope or The Force Awakens suggests that anything other than the large planet-destroying base was destroyed, so this criticism, which would have been senseless in the age of Empire, is senseless now.

2. There Is No Gravity In Space.

Again Shapiro takes aim at the beloved Empire Strikes Back. Wait -- as it turns out, he's not criticizing the scene in Empire where Tie Bombers drop bombs on an asteroid in which the Millennium Falcon is hiding. Instead he is criticizing the opening scene where a bomber drops bombs on a First Order Dreadnought. Shapiro admits "It's a cool scene," but adds it to his list for the sake of volume (even though he ends up with an awkward 19, rather than 20, criticisms). Ignoring the possibilities that the bombs could have been calibrated to seek out the (admittedly weak) gravity of the (huge) Dreadnought, or even a more basic explanation of mechanisms that kick the bombs out into space and/or magnets that activate after a delay, Shapiro decides that the film is worthy of criticism for not explaining every little detail. This is the first step on a dark path that leads to Midi-chlorians.

Also there is no sound in space, and has Shapiro ever criticized that? Probably not.

3. Snoke Is A Throwaway.

Shapiro is angry that Snoke dies before the third movie because he apparently wants Episodes 7-9 to completely retread the plot lines of the original trilogy even though this was the biggest problem with The Force Awakens (no, Rey being able to use the Force effectively despite being a woman whose extensive experience spelunking through wreckage and abilities to fight off multiple attackers with a stick should give her a far stronger baseline for reflexes, strength, and combat abilities in general untrained is not the biggest problem with The Force Awakens).

Snoke was an arrogant jerk who treated Emperor Palpatine the same way that Kylo Ren treats Darth Vader. Snoke stole the giant-head hologram (wonderfully used in The Last Jedi), large swivel-chair, and red-guard fetish that the Emperor had. Rather than keep this guy around for too long, he is killed off in a sudden manner that is surprising, new, and that leads to an excellent lightsaber vs. energy sword/spear/etc. fight.

4. Kylo Ren Isn’t Intimidating.

Shapiro complains that Kylo Ren not being competent, strong, or Darth Vader-y enough is "the biggest problem." Shapiro wants the films to sacrifice what makes Kylo Ren interesting (his conflicted nature and the fact that he is still growing in power and knowledge of the Force) in favor of him filling the Darth Vader gap that cannot and should not be filled. And to the extent that Shapiro argues that Kylo Ren is difficult to see as "the ultimate bad guy," it is unclear if this is the role that Kylo Ren is supposed to play, and leaves open many new and interesting directions that Episode 9 may take.

5. Rey’s Backstory Sucks.

This criticism is so misguided that it is worth quoting in part:
The series wanted to reset so that anybody could have abilities with the Force — a laudable goal. But by sucking Rey out of the family drama, we’re no longer dealing with the central storyline — a point Kylo Ren makes to Rey openly. I guess the idea is that we’re supposed to now think that small street urchins without any sort of bloodline can become incredible Jedi. That’s democratic, but it’s not true to the storyline, and it doesn’t provide any drama.
Does Shapiro think that Mace Windu, Yoda, Plo Koon, and Ki-Adi-Mundi were all related? The prequels established that the Jedi kidnap? recruit small children from all over the place into their ranks if they are discovered to be Force-sensitive. That broom kid would be gone in a second if those boring old codgers were still sitting around in that tower. Shapiro's complaint that Rey is not a Skywalker or a Kenobi therefore both ignores canon and avoids what made A New Hope so appealing -- the notion that some random farm kid could turn out to be a hero with powers who eventually took down a laser-moon.

6. Luke’s Weird Farmer Life Is Weird.

Shapiro's full complaint is:
Did we really need a whole day of Luke going around milking an alien seacow and drinking it?
Absolutely. That scene is iconic.

7. Luke Is A Bad Teacher.

Luke doesn't want to be a teacher and his confidence has been shattered by his disastrous last attempt. Luke's reluctance to teach and lack of thorough lessons makes sense. Shapiro, however, is correct to the extent that I wanted more scenes with Rey carrying Mark Hamill around in her backpack.

8. Celebrity Cameos Make No Sense.

Shapiro apparently thinks that Laura Dern and Benicio Del Toro are "celebrity cameos." These are not cameo appearances. Justin Theroux briefly appearing as the Master Codebreaker is a cameo. Daniel Craig playing a stormtrooper in The Force Awakens was a cameo. Laura Dern and Benecio Del Toro play full-on characters in the film and just happen to be actors that Shapiro knows better.

9. Poe Dameron’s Story Arc Is Foolish.

Shapiro says that "Poe is supposed to be a newfangled Han Solo." No he isn't. Shapiro says that "Poe is a dolt." Not really, although Poe is a hotheaded pilot who needs to learn to be a part of the team, and his learning this is the focus of his character growth in the movie.

Shapiro wanders off into the criticism that Laura Dern should have told Poe her plan, and that Poe ends up making "stupid plans with Finn that have no actual effect on the plotline." Shapiro ignores that the "stupid plans" end up getting most everyone killed, which is an "actual effect." And Shapiro assumes that an Admiral should tell a recently-demoted-for-being-too-impulsive-and-therefore-getting-most-every-Resistance-pilot-killed captain what her plans are.

10. Finn’s Storyline Is Useless.

We are ten criticisms in and finally have a bit of a valid point -- the Finn and Rose adventure on the casino planet did not add very much to the story and at times (read: during the alien horse chase) was goofy. Shapiro, though, argues that Finn should have died in the last movie and in this one and says that nothing comes from Finn's story. Finn is an interesting character who ultimately grows as a result of his (yes, silly) quest from being a deserter to a man willing to die for a cause and finally confronts his old tormentor, Phasma, head on.

11. Rose Is Useless.

Rose both helps Finn grow and serves to show that the briefly-seen pilots and ground crew of the Resistance have interesting backstories and can become heroes themselves and who may have even more notable and interesting roles in future films. But the movie did not count out the possibility that she is a Skywalker, so don't count her out so quickly, Shapiro.

12. Social Justice Warrioring On Interplanetary Monte Carlo Is Awful. Awful.

The one interesting thing about the casino planet was the notion of third parties profiting from the war -- a dimension that we have not yet seen, and a notion that hints at happenings in the galaxy as a whole. We should probably start thinking this way if Rian Johnson's next trilogy is going to be set beyond the immediate back and forth between the Empire/First Order and Rebellion/Resistance. Also, it's strange that pointing out alien-animal abuse is "Social Justice Warrioring." Using enslaved animals to one's advantage against the enemy is a time honored Star Wars tradition (or, at least it happened with dinosaurs in the (amazing) Ewok movie, The Battle for Endor). Also, stop trying to make "Social Justice Warrioring" as a verb happen, Shapiro.

13. Captain Phasma Is A Nothing.

So was Boba Fett, but everyone loves him. At least Phasma briefly has some cool moments, displays an evil personality, and has a fight scene. As you can see, in part, here, Boba Fett stood around, said five words, got his gun disabled immediately, fired a useless rope, took an awkwardly long time to raise up his arm which had another gun on it, fired two shots, and then was accidentally knocked into the mouth of an alien ant eater. But everyone loves him.

14. Luke Shouldn’t Have Been A Hologram.

Shapiro's criticism here is borderline incomprehensible.
Why is it cool for Luke to survive a barrage from AT-ATs if he’s not even there?
...it makes sense that he survives because he isn't there. And it's cool for several reasons, the most obvious of which is him dusting off his shoulder.
Why is it cool for Luke to best Kylo Ren in a light saber battle if (1) Rey has already done so, and (2) Luke isn’t even there?
...he doesn't best Kylo Ren, and the no-contact hologram fight is pretty cool and leads to a surprise that he isn't there.
They easily could have brought Luke there, and had him do exactly the same thing, but sacrifice himself — or perhaps just fade away in front of Kylo Ren.
I hope that Shapiro sticks to being a "Provocative Gladiator" and never somehow stumbles into writing for these movies.

15. The Powers Of The Force Aren’t Magic.

I too wish that the Force only kept doing what it did in the earlier films and that it was never used or developed in interesting ways.

16. Light Speed Can't Be Used As A Weapon.

Shapiro correctly (what?!) points out that if light speed could be used as a weapon, it would be used more often. While that is a bit of a hole, the upshot is not that light speed "can't" be used as a weapon, so Shapiro's argument is muddled and pointless. Most importantly, Shapiro calls into question the best moment in the film and one of the best moments in the series. I don't care if it raises questions or if there are plot holes, the hyperspace moment was fantastic.

17. Why Would Luke Try To Kill Kylo?

Because he was never raised as a Jedi, nearly killed Vader before he finally stopped hacking at him, has killed SO MANY people, and has finally built something after a lifetime of seeing many of those close to him die only to see that thing on the verge of being torn down. I've seen other self-proclaimed Star Wars nerds raise this point as well, and it boggles the mind how little clue they have about Luke's experiences and the effect that they might have on a person.

18. There Are No Interesting Characters Left Except For Kylo Ren.

Shapiro complains that the characters from the original trilogy are no longer around and misses the whole point of the new movies handing the story off to a new generation. As for the new characters, Shapiro argues that Rey has a "crappy backstory," (ENOUGH with everyone needing to be a Skywalker), "Finn is a nonentity," (what does this even mean, and no, he has heart, is funny, and is the first character we have seen cross over from a background of serving the bad guys to the side of the Rebellion/Resistance), and "nobody cares about Rose," (nobody cares what Shapiro thinks about Rose).

19. Kylo Should Have Sided With Rey.

"This is the biggest problem of all."

Shapiro's list is so bloated that he forgets that the "biggest problem" was previously listed at number four: Kylo Ren's lack of being intimidating and no longer being a credible "big bad." Not only is this sloppy writing, it is a fascinating contradiction. Kylo Ren should be scarier and a more intimidating bad guy, but he ALSO should have joined up with Rey? And, "Kylo is far more interesting as a character trying to hold his darkness in check than as a guy who gives into it" misses the point.  What makes Kylo Ren interesting and new is that he is trying to be evil, but is being occasionally won over by the good that is still in him. Kylo Ren's conflicted nature makes him a compelling character, but having him join up with Rey would have been a redemption that a character who killed Han Solo (and many, many others) a few hours ago does not deserve.

Shapiro goes on to undo a bit of his article's nonsense by pointing out some good things about The Last Jedi, but it is too little, too late. If anyone has any other problems they want to point out with the movie, feel free to leave them in the comments where I may or may not address them.

READ MORE - Star Wars: The Last Jedi: The Review of the Shapiro Review

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Gavel News from Iowa

Saturday

I'm in Iowa for the next several days visiting family for Christmas. This morning, this article in a local paper about an Iowa City gavel maker caught my eye:

It all started in the early 1990s when Iowa City letter carrier Chester Schulte attended one of his union meetings here.

“They can be kind of noisy at times,” he said with a grin, “and the president was trying to get their attention, but he didn’t have a gavel.” 
So Schulte, a lifelong woodworker hobbyist, headed to his shop, turned a proper gavel and gave it to his union leader. “It helped at future meetings,” he told me. 
Word of the gift spread, mostly through union associations in Iowa and beyond. Today, he figures he has made nearly 700 distinctive gavels over the years for groups and individuals nationwide who wanted a finely crafted tool for calling a meeting to order. 
. . .

Now at 70, Schulte has been retired for several years but is still making his exquisite gavels from native Iowa hardwoods. 
He recently stopped by Congressman Dave Loebsack’s office in Iowa City and dropped off a specially crafted oversized gavel with the idea it might be used in Washington, D.C., at some point to call the U.S. House of Representatives to order. 
“It was huge,” Gloria Stutts, the woodworker’s wife, reported. “Formidable.” 
Chester declared his ultimate dream would be to provide a nice gavel for the U.S. Supreme Court.
Just about every courtroom I have appeared in has a gavel, but I have rarely seen any judge use them. I am not aware if any of them are Schulte's creations, and the fact that Schulte chooses not to sign or initial his gavels means I may never know.

READ MORE - Gavel News from Iowa

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Thor: Ragnarok Does Not Exemplify Trial By Combat

Tuesday

Over at the ABA Journal, Adam Banner claims that Thor: Ragnarok is the "latest instance of trial by combat in popular culture." He writes (don't worry, no spoilers yet): 

First off, if you haven’t seen the new Thor film, I highly suggest it. It’s one of the best entries in the Marvel Cinematic Universe, and it contains one of the best scenes any fan could ask for: a battle between the God of Thunder and a giant, green rage monster. Without giving too much away, Thor is promised his freedom if he can best his captor’s “champion” in combat—it just so happens that champion is a super-angry Hulk. Trial by combat? Definitely.
I've seen Thor: Ragnarok twice (it's fantastic), and I've written a fair amount about trial by combat (see blog posts here, here, and here and a peer reviewed (!?) article that I coauthored with my former classmate, Raj Shah here). After reflecting on the history, basis, and characteristics of historic (and even Game-of-Thrones-style) trial by combat, the fight between Thor and Hulk in the movie cannot be fairly characterized as an example of trial by combat.

Banner (what a name for a guy writing about a fight that involves the Hulk) decides to write his article without spoilers, which allows him to advance his claim behind a fog of uncertainty that maybe there are other events in the movie that make the fight into a trial by combat scenario. I'll get into the nitty-gritty of the events leading up to the fight in the movie after the break, so I guess there are some minor spoiler alerts for those who didn't watch the trailers and put two and two together.



Banner's summary of historic trial by combat is a broad-stroke treatment, but is generally correct -- in instances of trial by combat in medieval England, the theory was that the victor in the combat was the one favored by God (an outcome made all the more likely by both participants taking oaths against sorcery or witchcraft). Banner does not mention the fact that trial by combat in medieval England typically involved a combat between champions selected by parties to a dispute, although he references Game of Thrones several times which employed a similar approach.

An important element of trial by combat is that it was typically employed as a method of dispute resolution. If arbitration between the parties or the court's involvement left the dispute unresolved, trial by combat remained as a last resort to settle the matter.

With that in mind, consider the background leading up to the fight between Thor and the Hulk. Thor is thrown through space and crashes onto the planet, Sakaar, which has a brutal system of quasi-government in which the Grandmaster (Jeff Goldblum) oversees a series of gladiatorial matches in his arena. Roving bands of scavengers roam the surface of the planet and either eat stragglers or, in the case of Thor, capture them so that they become slaves "prisoners with jobs" who fight in the Grandmaster's arena.

Thor is captured and forced to fight in the arena. The Grandmaster tells Thor that if he defeats the reigning Champion, Thor will be freed. This Champion turns out to be the Hulk, and after some initial attempts to amiably avert a fight, battle ensues.

This is not an example of trial by combat because, despite Banner's claim that there is a dispute, there is no underlying argument that the combat is designed to resolve. Hulk and Thor are not champions for parties disagreeing with each other, and the guilt or innocence of the parties for some crime is not an issue to be resolved in the combat. At best, Banner might claim that there is a dispute between Thor and the Grandmaster as to whether Thor should be freed, with Thor's victory assuring his freedom, and his defeat ensuring that he becomes another Doug. But this is not so much a dispute to be resolved as an incentive to goad Thor into participating in the fights. Thor is never on equal footing or able to present any sort of case against the Grandmaster, and is instead just a prisoner fighting for freedom, rather than a party fighting for a side of a case. While this could be an interesting metaphor for whether defendants (and especially prisoners) in the US criminal justice system have any sort of fair shot in proving their innocence or in seeking habeas relief, this gets us off of the subject of trial by combat (although it leaves us with some interesting ideas for future thinkpieces on the film).

As much as I love to see attention drawn to quirky areas of the law like trial by combat, Thor: Ragnarok is not an accurate example of the practice. Banner's oversimplification of the practice and failure to address the background of the Thor vs. Hulk fight unfortunately lead him to the wrong conclusion. I can only hope, for my sake, that if Banner ends up reading this post, it doesn't end up making him angry.

READ MORE - Thor: Ragnarok Does Not Exemplify Trial By Combat

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Bacongate: Did Senator Leahy Read My Confirmation Hearing Outline for Justice Willett?

Wednesday

Business Insider reports on a ridiculous exchange between Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial Nominee, Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett, a video of which is below:



Back when Justice Willet was being considered as a potential Supreme Court nominee, I wrote this post highlighting questions that could be asked at Willett's confirmation hearing based on his prior tweets. From that post, here is one of my potential questions (and the accompanying tweet):

As a Supreme Court Justice (or federal judge) would you be willing to expand the Supreme Court's previous decisions that expanded the definition of marriage?



In a fascinating display of either: (1) failing to understand simple humor; or (2) extreme partisan interpretation, Leahy lambasted Willet's tweet as an attack on gay marriage and the Supreme Court's decision legalizing gay marriage. From Business Insider:
"I don't think one would see that as praising the Supreme Court decisions," Leahy said of the tweet.
While I am happy that I was able to predict at least one of the tweets that would come up in Willett's confirmation hearing, Leahy taking the tweet in this direction made a farce of his line of questioning. Senators with concerns about Willett taking conservative stances on legal issues certainly have plenty to work with, but this exchange is just (to use some legal terminology) goofy.

All of this aside, I will assume without evidence that Senator Leahy got the idea to ask about that tweet by reading my blog, and I thank the good Senator for his attention to my work.

READ MORE - Bacongate: Did Senator Leahy Read My Confirmation Hearing Outline for Justice Willett?

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Honolulu Bans Looking at Cell Phones While Crossing The Street

Thursday

NPR reports here and here on a recent ordinance passed by the City and County of Honolulu that prohibits people from "viewing" "mobile electronic devices" while crossing a street or highway. From NPR:

Police in Honolulu on Wednesday will begin writing tickets for people who get distracted by their cellphones while walking in a crosswalk. Honolulu is the first major city in the country to pass such a law, citing a high rate of pedestrians being hit in crosswalks.
"Starting today, texting while walking in a crosswalk can get you a ticket," Hawaii Public Radio's Bill Dorman reports for our Newscast unit. "In fact, a downward glance at a screen of any kind will cost you — a phone, a tablet, a video game."
Under the new law, the only legal reason for a pedestrian to use a cellphone while crossing a street or highway would be to call 911 to report an emergency.
One of the NPR reports claims that Fort Lee, New Jersey banned texting while crossing the street a few years ago, but its only support for this claim is a link to a story where police say that they are cracking down on pedestrians who are in the road illegally and are also on their phones. There is no indication that looking at a device without engaging in some other illegal activity was banned.

Because this apparently is the first major restriction of crossing the street while looking at devices, this post takes a deep dive into the ordinance. There are some quirks and questions that the ordinance raises, and I lay them out in painstaking detail after the break.

The text of the ordinance is here. Initially I was surprised, as it seems that the new ordinance bans viewing mobile electronic devices while walking but now permits driving while viewing mobile devices (as the prior restriction on driving while using mobile electronic devices is repealed). After a bit more digging, however, it appears that this is not the practical effect, as Hawaii has a statewide ban on driving while using mobile electronic devices. So while Honolulu may no longer have an ordinance banning driving while texting, the practice is still illegal.

Most outlets reporting on the ordinance state that it bans texting while crossing the street. It does, but the scope of the ordinance is broader than that. The ordinance applies not only to cell phones, but to any electronic device that either: (1) is capable of providing wireless or electronic communication between two or more people; or (2) is capable of "providing amusement."  The ban includes but is not limited to cell phones, pagers, PDAs, laptops, video games, and digital cameras. The ordinance also states that it does not include "audio equipment." 

This definition of "mobile electronic device" is of particular interest and concern to me, as I am one of the seven or eight remaining people in the country who does not use a smartphone to listen to music while walking. Instead, I use an iPod Nano -- and before you ask, yes, that's what I used before Baby Driver made listening to those devices cool again. The iPod Nano has a screen that displays information about each song, and that you can use to scroll through to select songs. iPods are not included on the list of banned devices - although the list is not exclusive, and the iPod has a screen and buttons that mirror some functions of smartphones. But, there is a strong argument that the iPod is "audio equipment," as its primary function is to play music.

The undefined "audio equipment" term is a holdover from the prior version of the ordinance which banned using electronic devices in vehicles. There, the term's application made a bit more sense -- you wouldn't be violating the ordinance if you were adjusting the volume of the radio in your car, for instance. But now that the ordinance has been reworked to apply only to viewing devices while walking, the scope of "audio equipment" is less clear.

The current ordinance's origin as a ban on devices in cars also raises some interesting questions about the how to interpret the terms of the ordinance. Under the original ban on devices in vehicles, the argument that the ban applies to looking at iPod screens seems more compelling in light of the "audio equipment" that already exists in nearly all vehicles, making it less likely that the "audio equipment" term applied to an iPod that one might bring into the car. Could this argument apply to the current version of the ordinance, which keeps the same "audio equipment" term, but repeals the various references to vehicles, or does the "audio equipment" term need to be reinterpreted in light of the rewording of the ordinance? I wouldn't be surprised to see this ordinance generate innumerable articles and books in which legal scholars do battle over the meaning of "audio equipment," and whether Michael Smith could be arrested for scrolling through his "Trial" playlist while jogging across the street (by no coincidence, my "Trial" playlist doubles as an excellent soundtrack for a run). To any law review editors in my audience who may receive these articles, please make sure that they cite to this blog post.

Another important term in the ordinance is "viewing," which the ordinance defines as "looking in the direction of the screen of a mobile electronic device." This means that speaking on a cell phone held to one's ear while crossing a street does not violate the ordinance. It would also apply to pedestrians who look at the back of their phones while crossing the street, in the event that anyone is interested in engaging in a particularly petty and pointless form of civil disobedience.

My issues with wording aside, there are arguments both for and against passing ordinances like this. On one hand, I understand the urge to cull the hordes of smartphone zombies that crowd city streets. People staring at phones run into objects and people, fail to cross streets in a timely manner, and may end up walking into the path of oncoming traffic in extreme circumstances. And putting down the phone for the several seconds it takes to cross a street is not a particularly heavy burden on pedestrians. On the other hand, the law may strike some as paternalistic and overreaching, and pedestrians may argue that they can remain alert to their surroundings while texting or emailing. And if pedestrians are injured in a traffic collision while on their phones, the doctrine of comparative negligence will likely reduce the damages that they can claim from the driver who injured them, as there is a strong argument that they should have been paying more attention.

Ultimately (again, problems with the language aside), the ordinance seems fine to me, as long as it remains limited to instances of pedestrians crossing the street and looking at screens on devices. This narrow set of circumstances should be easy enough for pedestrians to understand, and limited enough to avoid selective (and often biased) enforcement of the law. And as someone who wants to get as much money as possible from the driver who may one day crash into me in the madhouse that is downtown Los Angeles, I already model my own behavior after Honolulu's ordinance so that I may avoid a reduction of my potential damages due to a comparative negligence defense.

READ MORE - Honolulu Bans Looking at Cell Phones While Crossing The Street

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Court Denies Sheriff Joe Arpaio's Request to Vacate All Orders and Dismiss Case Following Pardon

Friday

NPR reports:
U.S. District Judge Susan Ritchie Bolton says that President Trump's pardon of former Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio does not "revise the historical facts" of his case — and that she will not vacate her ruling that found Arpaio guilty of criminal contempt.
On Thursday, Bolton quoted Black's Law Dictionary to say that a pardon "releases the wrongdoer from punishment and restores the offender's civil rights without qualification." But she then added a further interpretation in her own words: "It does not erase a judgment of conviction, or its underlying legal and factual findings."
The NPR story contains a copy of the Order, but a complete copy of the Order can be found here. Additional coverage of this most recent development can be found here and here. Arpaio's attorneys have filed a notice of appeal of the ruling. My own discussion of the Arpaio pardon can be found here.

I do not have a time to do my own research on the law of pardons in the Ninth Circuit, but from the court's focus on the law of other circuits it appears that there does not seem to be any clean, controlling precedent in the Ninth Circuit. The court was not persuaded by Arpaio's reliance on U.S. v. Schaffer in which the DC Circuit vacated all orders following a pardon. The judge noted that due to the procedural background of Schaffer, the only issue pending was the court's grant of a new trial to Schaffer, which left Schaffer in a position "as if no trial had ever taken place." Accordingly, the seemingly broad order in Schaffer had a limited effect, which distinguished the ruling in Schaffer from Arpaio's broader request.

When this Order is appealed, I expect that the quick discussion in footnote one of the Order will be expanded upon. Here is the text of that footnote (with hyperlinks to the text of the cited cases added):

The United States Supreme Court originally signaled in dicta that a presidential pardon may have an expunging effect. See Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1866) ("A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence."). The Court later rejected this view. See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915) ("[A pardon] carries an imputation of guilt; acceptance a confession of it."). Other courts have followed suit. See, e.g., In re North, 62 F.3d 1434, 1436-37 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding Garland dicta not controlling); United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Bjerkan v. United States, 529 F.2d 125, 128 n.2 (7th Cir. 1975) (same).
As the case works its way up through appeals, I suspect that discussion of the Supreme Court precedents and their interactions will move from the footnotes to the text of whatever opinions result. And if the law in the Ninth Circuit addressing this pardon issue is as absent as it seems from Judge Bolton's order, it will be interesting to see how the Ninth Circuit addresses the issue. In the end, I suspect that the ruling will not be favorable to Arpaio, but if the Ninth Circuit takes a thorough approach to the analysis (see, e.g., the approach in Noonan), the decision could be a notable contribution to this rarely-litigated area of law.

READ MORE - Court Denies Sheriff Joe Arpaio's Request to Vacate All Orders and Dismiss Case Following Pardon

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Plaintiff Asks Court to Declare That Defendant is a "BULLY"

Tuesday

From this tweet by Keith Lee, I learned of this fascinating Complaint filed on Sunday in the New York County Supreme Court. Lee takes note of the first two paragraphs of the Complaint, which are admittedly colorful:

1. The date, September 7, 2017, is a date that shall live in infamy in Staten Island history. On September 7, 2017, the circus came to town. The Defendant, DENNIS W. QUIRK (“QUIRK”) in his individual and personal capacity exploded on the courthouse steps as part rabid-dog and part carnival-barker, in a dangerous, intentional, outrageous, and malicious manner. QUIRK caused serious, substantial, unconscionable, intentional, and malicious harm to the Plaintiff, MICHAEL J. PULIZOTTO (“PULIZOTTO”), in the center of the public square – the steps of the Richmond County Courthouse – all to advance QUIRK’s own personal and political agenda.
2. The date, September 7, 2017, shall always and hereafter be known as “THE DAY OF THE RAT” in Richmond County.
The Complaint goes on to allege that Quirk set up a large inflatable rat outside the parking lot of the courthouse in an effort to ridicule Pulizotto, among many other things. Notably, in Paragraph 2, Pulizotto does not only use "THE DAY OF THE RAT" as shorthand for future reference in the document (as he does with "QUIRK" and "PULIZOTTO"), but dramatically states that September 7, 2017 shall be known as "THE DAY OF THE RAT" in Richmond County. It is unlikely that the Court has the authority to make such a declaration (as such a declaration would likely be within the province of county authorities), but Pulizotto does not seek the labeling of that date in his prayer for relief.

While I found much of the Complaint entertaining, due to its length and excessive hyperbole, I was not able to read the entire thing. But as I skimmed through, these two paragraphs caused me to chuckle:
56. Merriam Webster Dictionary defines “BULLY” as a blustering, browbeating person; especially: one who is habitually cruel, insulting, or threatening to others who are weaker, smaller, or in some way vulnerable.
57. QUIRK is a BULLY.
As it turns out, these two paragraphs end up being relevant to Pulizotto's causes of action, specifically, his cause of action for declaratory judgment. For those who need to brush up on their remedies, a declaratory judgment is: "A binding judgment from a court defining the legal relationship between parties and their rights in the matter before the court" which does not provide for enforcement.

What sort of declaratory judgment does Pulizotto seek?
AS AND FOR A SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF(DECLARATORY JUDGMENT)
181. Plaintiff, PULIZOTTO, repeats, realleges, and restates all paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein and further states as follows.
182. As specifically plead above, a bona fide, justiciable, and substantial controversy exists as between the Defendant, QUIRK, and the Plaintiff, PULZOTTO [sic].
183. The Defendant, QUIRK, and the Plaintiff, PULZOTTO [sic] have adverse legal interests.
184. A judgment would serve a useful purpose in clarifying or settling the legal issues as between the Defendant, QUIRK, and the Plaintiff, PULZOTTO [sic].
185. There is a clear and ascertainable standard for the Court to rule on this issue, to wit: Merriam Webster Dictionary defines “BULLY” as a blustering, browbeating person; especially: one who is habitually cruel, insulting, or threatening to others who are weaker, smaller, or in some way vulnerable.
186. A judgment would finalize the controversy and offer relief from uncertainty as to whether the Defendant, DENNIS W. QUIRK is a “BULLY”.
And in addition to the $25 million in compensatory and punitive damages that Pulizotto seeks in his Prayer for Relief, he also asks for:
G. a declaration that: “DENNIS W. QUIRK IS A BULLY.”;

 
Declaratory judgments may be used to stop litigation "bullies" from sending repetitive demand letters or making meritless threats of litigation, but this is the first instance of which I am aware in which a party has sought to use the remedy to give its name calling the force of law. While Quirk likely does not want to be called a "Bully," the "BULLY" label that Pulizotto seeks is of no legal consequence and bears no apparent relevance to the parties' legal relationship or rights, the Court will almost certainly refuse to grant Pulizotto the requested relief on this cause of action.
 
Pulizotto may well have strong, negative feelings toward Quirk, but incorporating such a petty and futile cause of action into his Complaint will likely do nothing but harm his credibility before the Court in future proceedings. This Complaint and its dramatic language therefore join the vast ranks of pleadings that are amusing, yet awful examples of how litigants should act.

[UPDATE, 10/18/2017]

Another no-no I just noticed in the drafting of the Complaint is that the Plaintiff repeatedly misspells his own name. I have updated the above quotes with [sic]'s so that readers do not accuse me of shoddy copying and pasting.

READ MORE - Plaintiff Asks Court to Declare That Defendant is a "BULLY"

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Wall Street Journal Praises Judicial Ignorance of Statistical Methods

Wednesday

From yesterday's Wall Street Journal editorial page covering yesterday's oral arguments in Gill v. Whitford, a case that involved a challenge to alleged gerrymandering:

[Chief Justice John Roberts] zeroed in on risks for the credibility of the judiciary if the Supreme Court invalidates a state electoral map on purely political grounds for the first time. His reference to EG is to a political science standard offered by the plaintiffs as a test of when an electoral map is too partisan.
. . .
Chief Justice: “It is just not, it seems, a palatable answer to say the ruling was based on the fact that EG was greater than 7%. That doesn’t sound like language in the Constitution.” . . .
[Plaintiffs' Attorney, Paul] Smith: “If you let this go, if you say this is—we’re not going to have a judicial remedy for this problem, in 2020, you’re going to have a festival of copycat gerrymandering the likes of which this country has never seen.
And it may be that you can protect the Court from seeming political, but the country is going to lose faith in democracy big time because voters are going to be like—everywhere are going to be like the voters in Wisconsin and, no, it really doesn’t matter whether I vote.”
Chief Justice: “No, but you’re going to take this—the whole point is you’re taking these issues away from democracy and you’re throwing them into the courts pursuant to, and it may be simply my educational background, but I can only describe as sociological gobbledygook.”
Gerrymanders are unsightly, but worse would be the sight of federal judges becoming political arbiters of every electoral map based on evidence that voters are likely to conclude is itself partisan.
An eye-opening Twitter thread by Steven Mazie illustrating how Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch appeared to lack knowledge of the statistical methodology involved paints Chief Justice Roberts' comment as more disturbing than the quippy Editorial Board lets on. While "gobbledygook" is a fun word, reminiscent of "argle bargle" and "pure applesauce" of old, the implications of the comment are that the Court -- the last resort for challenging (often-complex) gerrymandering schemes -- should decline to do so because the methods involved are too complicated and potentially subject to partisan manipulation. Jesse Wegman at the New York Times' editorial page covers Smith's response, which summarizes this problem:
“The problem in this area is if you don’t do it, it is locked up,” Mr. Smith said. “You are the only institution in the United States that can solve this problem just as democracy is about to get worse because of the way gerrymandering is getting so much worse.”
Gerrymanders are more than "unsightly" as the Journal describes. The contorted and bizarre-looking voting districts that gerrymandering creates may result in disenfranchisement of voters along party and racial lines. They threaten representative democracy. The Journal's and Chief Justice's implication that a lack of understanding of statistical methods is enough of a barrier to let this threat go unchallenged is concerning.

READ MORE - Wall Street Journal Praises Judicial Ignorance of Statistical Methods

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Trump to Nominate Justice Don Willett for Fifth Circuit

Thursday

So reports San Antonio Express-News:

President Trump on Thursday will nominate two conservatives from Texas with compelling personal stories to the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, according to a senior administrative official.
Texas Supreme Court Justice Don Willett was cited by Trump as a potential U.S. Supreme court pick during his presidential campaign. Dallas appellate lawyer James Ho is a former Texas solicitor general who has argued cases before state and federal courts.
Willett -- a prolific Twitter user whose wit with more than 96,000 followers and the title of Texas “Tweeter Laureate” --had gently mocked Trump in some tweets during the campaign for the White House.
The article has a collection of some of Justice Willett's "gently mock[ing]" tweets.

I had previously blogged about Justice Willett back in the heyday of speculation as to who Trump would nominate to fill the Supreme Court seat left vacant by the death of Justice Antonin Scalia. At the time, Justice Willett was on Trump's list of potential nominees, although Trump ultimately nominated now-Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Court.

It will be interesting to see whether Justice Willett faces heightened scrutiny in his confirmation hearing given his prior inclusion on Trump's list of potential Supreme Court nominees. Justice Willett also may have a wider public profile than some of Trump's other nominees in light of his active, and often humorous, Twitter account. This, coupled with existing dissatisfaction by Democrats on the Senate Judiciary Committee may lead to some interesting exchanges whenever the hearings end up taking place.

READ MORE - Trump to Nominate Justice Don Willett for Fifth Circuit

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Talking in Public: A Cautionary Tale for Lawyers

Tuesday

Kenneth Vogel of The New York Times has this remarkable story that should serve as a cautionary tale for all attorneys who may feel tempted to speak about their cases and clients outside of the office. Vogel reports that he was getting lunch with a source in a Washington DC restaurant, when he noticed Ty Cobb, the attorney retained by the White House to assist in responding to various Russia investigations, having a conversation with John Dowd, Trump's "lead outside counsel in the Russia investigations."

Mr. Cobb was not difficult to notice, on account of his incredible moustache:



Mr. Cobb chose to discuss his work in representing the White House in the Russia investigations, and apparently talked loudly and extensively enough about his work to give rise to this story detailing the conflict among Trump's attorneys over the proper level of cooperation in the Russia investigations.

From Vogel's article describing how he got the scoop:
I ordered yet another iced tea, and continued typing away, as Mr. Cobb and Mr. Dowd delved deeper, not paying me any mind.
They discussed presidential privilege and its effect on document production, tensions on the legal team and their colleagues. Mr. Cobb suggested one colleague was not on the president’s good side, but added, “I’m trying to get the president not to pick a fight with her.”
Finally, after more than 45 minutes of my assiduously listening to their conversation by myself, Mr. Cobb picked up the check and announced to Mr. Dowd, “All right, boss, I got to roll back to my little hole. I’ve got like a seven and a half foot ceiling ... Wilt Chamberlain couldn’t stand up in it.”
Attorneys are often warned during training or in law firm policies to avoid discussing matters related to their work in public settings. Whether it is in a restaurant, on the sidewalk, or in the elevator, attorneys should avoid discussing clients and cases, as any information communicated to lawyers is privileged, and attorneys' strategies and theories are protected by the work product doctrine. Speaking up about privileged information in a public setting is a very easy way for an attorney to run into serious problems.

Warnings against public discussion of work are often confined to the hypothetical elevator or restaurant. But Vogel's article gives a spectacular real-world example of what attorneys everywhere should avoid doing.

READ MORE - Talking in Public: A Cautionary Tale for Lawyers

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Boating Under the Influence and Probable Cause

Wednesday

Here's some good news out of Iowa: it appears that incidents involving people boating under the influence of alcohol are on the decline. From this KCRG report:

A total of 78 full time Iowa Department of Natural Resources conservation officers cover Iowa's 99 counties. This summer those officers did get the help from 29 seasonal water patrol officers but that still means full timers have multiple counties under their care. And when you consider around 500 boats may be out on a typical holiday weekend just at Coralville Reservoir alone, catching someone boating under the influence can be a challenge.
. . .
"If a state trooper or deputy officer in the cities, they know 'okay they're going across the lines.' There's no lines on the water. There's no evidence left other than the wake," said [Iowa Department of Natural Resources conservation officer, Eric] Wright.
By late July at Coralville Reservoir only three people had been arrested this summer for the crime. If you think that number is low, you're not alone.
"There's been fairly heavy enforcement on Coralville itself and we're starting to see the effects of it."
Data obtained by I9 through an Iowa open records request shows BWI arrests at Coralville have been on the decline since at least 2014 when 33 people were charged. The numbers statewide show a similar story, arrests did spike however in 2015 when 47 people were arrested. Fast forward to July of this present year and that number drops to 29.
The consequences for boating under the influence are similar if you are caught driving a car drunk in Iowa but if you get a BWI there is nothing stopping you from losing your driving privileges out on the road. In fact, when I9 searched the names of people charged over the years with BWI we found several who also had OWIs on their record as well.
The report is a bit confusing -- particularly the second-to-last paragraph. It is unclear whether the 47 people were arrested statewide or in the Coralville reservoir alone (the context suggests that it is in Coralville alone). With that number in the mix, the claim that arrests have been on the decline since 2014 isn't accurate - rather the arrests seem to have been on the decline since 2015 (assuming 2016 had fewer than 47 arrests, but more than 29).

But I did not highlight this story or spend untold numbers of what could have been billable hours writing this post to slog through numbers. Instead, I was intrigued by Officer Wright's discussion of deciding whether to pull over a boat -- noting that unlike officers who decide to pull over a car, there may not be clear cut instances where the car crosses a lane line. While the Fourth Amendment restricts officers from the unreasonable seizure of vehicles, officers are permitted to stop a vehicle if they have reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime has occurred -- or "probable cause." Most typically, officers can establish probable cause by observing a traffic violation, like failing to signal, crossing a lane line, or speeding. But what about boats?

A potential basis for stopping a boat is analyzed in depth in the Iowa Supreme Court case of State v. Pettijohn. There, the Court held that an officer's stop of a boat was constitutional because the officer reasonably believed that the operator of the boat was violating Iowa Code 462A.12, which prohibits the reckless, negligent, or careless operation of a vessel, water skis, surfboard, or similar device. The basis for the violation? The defendant was driving a boat while a passenger was dangling her feet in the water near the motor, which the officer knew used an unguarded propeller based on his knowledge of the type of boat that he observed. Section 462A.12 likely operates as a catch all, as officers can likely articulate reasons for stopping boats based on numerous circumstances, including boating in darkness without lights (assuming there aren't laws that already specifically address that), or unsafe speed (particularly with other boats present), or both!  See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Cannon (attorney suspended from practice of law for various prior alcohol/drug related offenses, including a boating while intoxicated offense in which he was stopped for accelerating "rather quickly" in a five mile per hour speed-limit zone at 10:30 p.m.).

Another potential basis for stopping a boat is mentioned, but not analyzed, in State v. Slade, where officers believed that a boat was over capacity, and stopped the boat for that reason. As it turns out, the boat contained 16 people, but only was designed to hold 14 people. Slade is notable because it involves "Party Cove" at the Coralville reservoir. Having grown up close to that location, were I to testify as an expert on the Fourth Amendment as applied to Iowa waters, I would likely conclude that the mere presence of a boat in that section of the reservoir constitutes probable cause to stop a boat on suspicion of boating under the influence. I doubt that the courts would agree with me, but that's just because the judges that make these important decisions haven't spent enough time out on the reservoir on the weekends.

But perhaps things have changed since I left Iowa.  KCRG notes that only three people had been arrested on the reservoir for boating under the influence by late July this year. This does not sound like the booze-soaked body of water of my childhood memories, and if the arrest numbers reflect a general trend towards less drinking and boating, then it's a trend that I welcome.

READ MORE - Boating Under the Influence and Probable Cause

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Recent Equifax Breach Prompts Criticism of Arbitration Provisions (Updated)

Friday

The credit monitoring firm, Equifax, recently suffered a massive data breach, resulting in the exposure of the personal information of approximately 143 million Americans. This personal information includes names, Social Security numbers, birth dates, and addresses.

Equifax, realizing how terrible this is, has tried to respond by offering free credit report monitoring services to its customers for a year. But this isn't going over very well, as it appears that Equifax may be attempting to get people to waive their class-action rights and agree to binding arbitration provisions by signing up for the credit-monitoring service. From the Wall Street Journal:

The fine print in the Equifax agreement concerning the monitoring services said that consumers who take part waive the ability to bring or participate in a class-action suit, a class arbitration or other similar legal actions. That seemed to suggest that consumers would be bound to an individual arbitration process with the company, which some argue is a more difficult place for consumer to get larger rewards for their problems.
The Washington Post has similar reporting here, and a report from MarketWatch is here.

The Terms of Service that contain the "fine print" can be found here. Here is the relevant provision:
Binding Arbitration. Any Claim (as defined below) raised by either You or Equifax against the other shall be subject to mandatory, binding arbitration. As used in this arbitration provision, the term "Claim" or "Claims" means any claim, dispute, or controversy between You and Us relating in any way to Your relationship with Equifax, including but not limited to any Claim arising from or relating to this Agreement, the Products or this Site, or any information You receive from Us, whether based on contract, statute, common law, regulation, ordinance, tort, or any other legal or equitable theory, regardless of what remedy is sought. This arbitration obligation extends to claims You may assert against Equifax’s parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors, assigns, employees, and agents. The term "Claim" shall have the broadest possible construction, except that it does not include any claim, dispute or controversy in which You contend that EIS violated the FCRA. Any claim, dispute, or controversy in which You contend that EIS violated the FCRA is not subject to this provision and shall not be resolved by arbitration.
The key in this paragraph is the definition of "Claim," which is sufficiently broad to cover damages arising from the data breach (as these damages presumably arise from one's relationship with Equifax).

Equifax may claim that the Terms of Service linked to above do not apply to customers who enroll in the "TrustedID Premier" program that Equifax is offering after the breach. That program is linked to from this page (with a URL of www.equifaxsecurity2017.com). The Terms of Service associated with the TrustedID program are here, and while they also contain a pretty stringent-sounding arbitration provision, it does not contain the same, extremely broad "Claim" definition. [NOTE: See update below].

But the Terms of Service that I initially quoted should still apply to those who enroll in the TrustedID service because those Terms are extremely broad in their potential application:
THIS PRODUCT AGREEMENT AND TERMS OF USE ("AGREEMENT") CONTAINS THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS UPON WHICH YOU MAY PURCHASE AND USE OUR PRODUCTS THROUGH THE WWW.EQUIFAX.COM, WWW.IDENTITYPROTECTION.COM AND WWW.IDPROTECTION.COM WEBSITES AND ALL OTHER WEBSITES OWNED AND OPERATED BY EQUIFAX AND ITS AFFILIATES ("SITE"). YOU MUST ACCEPT THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT CONTAINED IN SECTION 4 BELOW, BEFORE YOU WILL BE PERMITTED TO REGISTER FOR AND PURCHASE ANY PRODUCT FROM THIS SITE. BY REGISTERING ON THIS SITE AND SUBMITTING YOUR ORDER, YOU ARE ACKNOWLEDGING ELECTRONIC RECEIPT OF, AND YOUR AGREEMENT TO BE BOUND BY, THIS AGREEMENT. YOU ALSO AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THIS AGREEMENT BY USING OR PAYING FOR OUR PRODUCTS OR TAKING OTHER ACTIONS THAT INDICATE ACCEPTANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT.
Sorry for all the capital letters. I strongly suspect that attorneys who draft terms of service agreements are secretly angry people, and sometimes the rage manifests itself in the work product.

In case you cannot read the paragraph above, it applies the terms in the Agreement to all websites owned and operated by Equifax and its Affiliates.

In response to critics pointing out how Equifax appears to be systematically herding potential Plaintiffs' into agreeing to binding arbitration, Equifax has set up this "Progress Update" page where it tries to put out the new fire that it has caused:
2). NO WAIVER OF RIGHTS FOR THIS CYBER SECURITY INCIDENT
In response to consumer inquiries, we have made it clear that the arbitration clause and class action waiver included in the Equifax and TrustedID Premier terms of use does not apply to this cybersecurity incident.
Have they though?

Let's go back to the Terms of Service -- specifically, to the relevant portion of the integration clause near the end:
ENTIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN US. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between You and Us regarding the Products and information contained on or acquired through this Site or provided by Us, including through other linked third party Internet sites.
This appears to exclude Equifax's damage control statements, which appear on a separate page and are not included in the terms of the Agreement. All Equifax would need to do would be to point to this clause and argue that its statements elsewhere about the arbitration agreement not applying are of no legal relevance.

In short, commentators who are criticizing Equifax's response seem to have a pretty good point. Signing up for Equifax's free (for a year) credit report monitoring service may result in a waiver of rights that the average consumer would not expect, and likely would not agree to if it were put into plain English.

All of this may end up being moot, however, as signing up for the credit monitoring service requires customers to give Equifax the last six digits of their Social Security numbers. Perhaps those willing to entrust Equifax with this information following a breach of this magnitude are willing to agree to just about anything, including a waiver of the right to trial and right to join in a class action.

[UPDATE: 9/11/2017]

I have revised the post above to add the link to the TrustedID Program Terms of Use, which I had not linked to in the original post. Additionally, at the time I wrote the initial post, the TrustedID Program's Terms of Use included an arbitration provision, albeit one that was less all-encompassing than the provision in Equifax's general Terms of Service Agreement. The TrustedID Program's Terms of Use have now been updated and no arbitration provision appears in these terms at all. The TrustedID Agreement contains integration clause near the end of the Agreement, which states, in pertinent part:
ENTIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN US. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between You and Us regarding the Products and information contained on or acquired through this website or provided by Us, including through other linked third party Internet sites.
This may have the effect of fulfilling Equifax's promise that their arbitration provisions do not apply to the recent breach. Users affected by the breach could visit the webpage for the TrustedID Program without ever accessing Equifax's general website (say, by linking to the TrustedID page from the link in the post above). And while the broad terms of Equifax's general Terms of Use still apply, Equifax would probably have a harder time arguing in court that customers are bound to the general Terms of Use if those customers could have enrolled in the TrustedID Program without ever visiting (or being prompted to visit) a page containing or linking to Equifax's general Terms of Use.

In short, users looking to enroll in the TrustedID Program now have a much stronger argument that they have not agreed to arbitration and may still pursue claims in court, either as individuals or through a class action. Of course, I just checked the TrustedID page and it is still seeking the last six digits of my Social Security Number ... so users still must decide whether entrusting Equifax with this information following the breach is a prudent action to take.

READ MORE - Recent Equifax Breach Prompts Criticism of Arbitration Provisions (Updated)

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North Carolina Court of Appeals Rejects Constitutional Challenge to Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation Causes of Action

Tuesday

From the Washington Post:

A jilted husband’s lawsuit against a doctor accused of stealing his wife’s love can proceed after a North Carolina appeals court ruled Tuesday that the husband can continue suing the spouse’s lover, seeking damages.
The state Court of Appeals decision resurrects a lawsuit that a trial judge had thrown out in Forsyth County, whose seat is Winston-Salem. The judge ruled that state law violates a person’s constitutional free speech and free expression rights to engage in intimate sexual activity and expression with other consenting adults.
North Carolina is one of only about a half-dozen states that still allow lawsuits accusing a cheating spouse’s lover of alienation of affection and criminal conversation.
The Court of Appeals' opinion is here. From the introduction to the opinion:
This case concerns two common law causes of action—alienation of affection and criminal conversation—that permit litigants to sue the lovers of their unfaithful spouses. These laws were born out of misogyny and in modern times are often used as tools for enterprising divorce lawyers seeking leverage over the other side.

Defendant Derek Williams contends that these aging common law torts are facially unconstitutional because they violate individuals’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to engage in intimate sexual activity, speech, and expression with other consenting adults.
As explained below, we reject this facial constitutional challenge. Claims for alienation of affection and criminal conversation are designed to prevent and remedy personal injury, and to protect the promise of monogamy that accompanies most marriage commitments. This sets these common law claims apart from the discriminatory sodomy law at issue in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which was not supported by any legitimate state interest and instead stemmed from moral disapproval and bigotry. Similarly, these laws (in most applications) seek to prevent personal and societal harms without regard to the content of the intimate expression that occurs in the extra-marital relationship. Thus, under United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), these torts are constitutional despite the possibility that their use burdens forms of protected speech and expression.

I have not had a chance to look through the opinion, but will do so in a later post. For now, the media outlets covering the case have failed to link to the full opinion, so hopefully anyone else who wants to write about it will see this post and link to the opinion like I did.

This case is particularly notable because a North Carolina Superior Court judge struck down an alienation of affection lawsuit in 2014 arguing that there was no rational basis for the law and noting that the law chilled protected speech. My post breaking down that decision and examining North Carolina's law is here.

From a quick glance at the Court of Appeals opinion, it looks like there is some fairly in-depth discussion of the law's First Amendment implications, which I will be interested in reading in light of my prior criticism of the law. Additionally, the fact that this is a facial challenge to the law may not foreclose future challenges -- although having an appellate decision on record upholding the law may deter lower courts from upholding such challenges. I will discuss this in more depth in a future post.

READ MORE - North Carolina Court of Appeals Rejects Constitutional Challenge to Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation Causes of Action

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A Survey of State Laws Against Glue Sniffing and Driving Under the Influence of Glue

Thursday

After writing yesterday's post on this story about a man arrested in Cedar Rapids, Iowa for allegedly driving while sniffing fumes from an aerosol can, I decided to do a little more research into glue sniffing laws in other states. As I noted in yesterday's post, Cedar Rapids' ordinance does not apply to any substances other than glue or cement, so any non-adhesive, aerosolized substances that people may inhale to get high are not covered by the ordinance. Additionally, I was unable to find any provisions in Iowa law regarding driving under the influence (operating while intoxicated) that clearly applied to driving while under the influence of inhaled glue or other aerosolized substances.

Cedar Rapids' ordinance banning glue sniffing states:

62.29 - GLUE SNIFFING.
(a) As used in this section the term model glue shall mean any glue or cement containing toluene, acetone, or other solvent or chemical having the property of releasing toxic vapors.   
(b) No person shall, for the purpose of causing a condition of intoxication, euphoria, excitement, exhilaration, stupefaction, or dulling of the senses or nervous system, smell or inhale the fumes from any model glue; provided, however, that this section shall not apply to the inhalation of any anesthesia for medical or dental purposes.                           
(c) No person shall possess, buy, sell, transfer possession, or receive possession of any model glue for the illegal purposes set forth in subsection (b) hereof.

While I concluded that Cedar Rapids' ordinance did not apply to the conduct described in the article, there are other, more expansive, state laws on glue sniffing that Cedar Rapids may want to imitate if it wants to broadly ban the huffing of fumes from glues and aerosols.

Tennessee and Indiana both have laws that outlaw not only the sniffing of glue, but of other substances as well. The relevant subsection of Tennessee's law, for example, states:
40-6-391(a)  No person shall, for the purpose of causing a condition of intoxication, inebriation, elation, dizziness, excitement, stupefaction, paralysis, or the dulling of the brain or nervous system, or disturbing or distorting of the audio or visual processes, intentionally smell or inhale the fumes from any glue, paint, gasoline, aerosol, chlorofluorocarbon gas or other substance containing a solvent having the property of releasing toxic vapors or fumes; provided, that nothing in this section shall be interpreted as applying to the inhalation of any anesthesia for medical or dental purposes, or to the use of nitrous oxide to implement the distribution of beverages or other foodstuffs for commercial purposes.
Unlike the Cedar Rapids ordinance, Tennessee's law lists a number of substances other than glue, including "aerosol." Another wider-reaching law on glue sniffing can be found in Indiana:
IC 35-46-6-1: "Model glue" defined
Sec. 1. As used in this chapter, "model glue" means a glue or cement containing toluene or acetone, or both.
IC 35-46-6-2: Inhaling toxic vapors
Sec. 2. A person who, with intent to cause a condition of intoxication, euphoria, excitement, exhilaration, stupefaction, or dulling of the senses, ingests or inhales the fumes of:
 (1) model glue; or
(2) a substance that contains:
            (A) toluene;
            (B) acetone;
            (C) benzene;
            (D) N-butyl nitrite;
            (E) any aliphatic nitrite, unless prescribed by a physician;
            (F) butane;
            (G) amyl butrate;
            (H) isobutyl nitrate;
            (I) freon;
            (J) chlorinated hydrocarbons;
            (K) methylene chloride;
            (L) hexane;
            (M) ether;
            (N) chloroform; or
            (O) halothane; or
(3) any other chemical having the property of releasing toxic vapors;
commits inhaling toxic vapors, a Class B misdemeanor.
Indiana's law is interesting because the stand-alone provisions regarding model glue are entirely unnecessary, as the "Inhaling Toxic Vapors" section applies not only to model glue, but also to "a substance that contains" toluene or acetone -- which includes "model glue," defined as a "glue or cement" that contains those chemicals.
 
What about driving under the influence of glue? For that, we go to the relevant sections of the law banning driving under the influence in Georgia:
O.C.G.A. 40-6-391 (2010)
40-6-391. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating substances; penalties; publication of notice of conviction for persons convicted for second time; endangering a child  
(a) A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any moving vehicle while: 
(1) Under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it is less safe for the person to drive;
(2) Under the influence of any drug to the extent that it is less safe for the person to drive;
(3) Under the intentional influence of any glue, aerosol, or other toxic vapor to the extent that it is less safe for the person to drive;
(4) Under the combined influence of any two or more of the substances specified in paragraphs (1) through (3) of this subsection to the extent that it is less safe for the person to drive;
(emphasis added)
 
Massachusetts also bans driving while under the influence of "the vapors of glue," although the law and applicable jury instructions do not provide a definition for the term.
 
If you were curious about various laws across the country after reading yesterday's post on glue sniffing, this post has hopefully been of some help to you. Additionally, all of this should make for excellent party conversation, so go forth and educate your friends on our nation's various laws prohibiting the inhalation of glue fumes, aerosols, and other chemicals.
 
[Author's note: while I have not yet submitted this post to the legal journals, let alone received any offers of publication, I do not think it presumptuous or premature to state that this post is almost-certainly forthcoming in a prestigious law review. Congratulations to you, dear reader, on seeing it here first.]

READ MORE - A Survey of State Laws Against Glue Sniffing and Driving Under the Influence of Glue

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